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The government is not the only player in copyright reform, and perhaps
not even the most important. Left to free market negotiation, risk averse
licensors and licensees are contracting around the statutory license for
certain types of copyright-protected content, and achieving greater effi-
ciency via private ordering. This emerging phenomenon, herein termed
“private copyright reform,” presents both adverse selection and dis-
tributive justice concerns: first, circumvention of the statutory license
goes against legislative intent by allowing for the reduction, and even
elimination, of statutorily mandated royalties owed to non-parties. In
addition, when presented without full term disclosure, privately deter-
mined royalty rates can lead to industrial and statutory adoption of
inaccurate “market” valuations. Finally, private copyright reform can
exacerbate market inequalities by leaving smaller, less powerful par-
ties with a weaker, less effective statutory regime. These concerns
could be addressed by comprehensive copyright reform, an ambitious
and lengthy process at best. The concerns might also be eliminated by
making compliance with the statutory license mandatory, thereby elimi-
nating private copyright reform as an option. Recognizing the effi-
ciency-enhancing value of private copyright reform, however, this
Article leaves the option to circumvent in place, and instead suggests
two modest statutory amendments to alleviate the adverse selection and
distributive justice concerns presented. Private copyright reform also
challenges traditional intellectual property doctrine; specifically, it
questions the efficiency of statutory licenses and collective rights orga-
nizations, while also raising questions of fairness around the ability of
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private parties to make law. While resolution of these doctrinal
questions is outside the scope of this Article, the recent proliferation of
private copyright reform suggests they are ripe for reconsideration.
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INTRODUCTION
James Taylor is an American singer and songwriter, and the recipient of
five Grammy awards. Over the span of his 45-year career, he has sold nearly
100 million albums.1 Best known for hits like “Fire and Rain” and “You’ve
Got a Friend,” Taylor was inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame in
2000.2 He was awarded the National Medal of Arts by President Obama in
2011, and performed at the presidential inauguration in January 2013.3
In 2007, an audit performed on Taylor’s royalty statements from his
long-time record label, Warner Brothers, uncovered a deficiency of
$1,692,726 alleged to constitute amounts owed for creative and inaccurate
1. Biography, JAMESTAYLOR.COM (Aug. 2012), http://www.jamestaylor.com/about/.
2. Id.
3. Id.
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accounting—and that only dates back to 2004.4 A second audit, conducted in
2010, found an additional deficiency of $1,147,591 covering just the three
years since the first audit.5 So far, Warner Brothers has owned up to
$764,056 (later adjusted downward to $147,278), and has paid only
$97,857.6 The alleged underpayment stems primarily from uncertainty sur-
rounding royalties owed from relatively new technologies and business mod-
els, including digital streaming and subscription services. In the music
industry, the lag between the introduction of a new technology like digital
streaming, and the statutory license’s ability to accommodate it, allows for
guesswork to fill in the gaps. This guesswork is often proven inaccurate by
eventual legislation,7 but corrections, when made, are slow.
As one among many, this example serves as a reminder that rapid tech-
nological development and concomitant changes in consumer behavior can
adversely affect not only copyright holding intermediaries and their business
models, but also, and importantly, the underlying creators—even those as
successful and well-advised as James Taylor—that the copyright laws are
tasked with protecting.8 While a recording artist at odds with his record label
is nothing new, the ever-changing and highly unstable music industry has
now produced an entirely new concern for artists and other non-parties: “pri-
vate copyright reform.”
As introduced herein, “private copyright reform” refers to private licens-
ing in the shadow of a statutory license. A statutory license is a common
mechanism in copyright that serves as an open offer that may be accepted by
any prospective licensee willing to pay the statutory rate and meet the statu-
4. Paul Resnikoff, 52 Ways to Screw an Artist, by Warner Bros. Records, DIGITAL
MUSIC NEWS (Sept. 19, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/120919
jamestaylor (citing omissions stemming from, among other sources, underpayment of mechan-
ical royalties, misallocation of recording expenses, nondisclosure of terms with third-party
licensees, non-payment for various synchronization uses, failure to pass-through performance
royalties, unauthorized compilation licenses, failure to apply proper tax credits, and interest).
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. For example, ad-supported internet services such as Pandora were not anticipated
when the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act was passed in 1995. 17 U.S.C.
§§ 106(6), 114 (2012). As a result, Internet radio services whose users paid a subscription fee
were subject to a compulsory royalty, while Internet radio services whose users watched ads
(in lieu of subscribing) were exempt from paying any royalties at all. This inadvertent result
led to a series of post-legislation arbitration sessions, beginning in 1998 with the session com-
monly known as Webcasting I. See In re Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings &
Ephemeral Recordings, Nos. 99-6 CARP DTRA, 2000-3 CARP DTRA (Dec. 4, 2000), availa-
ble at http://www.copyright.gov/carp/114schedule.html.
8. Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution authorizes Congress to “pro-
mote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.” Notwithstanding
the fact that many songwriters and, to an even greater degree, recording artists, assign their
rights to an intermediary publishing company or record label, the task of copyright arguably
remains the encouragement of creators themselves.
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tory terms.9 These private content licensing agreements circumvent both the
statutory license and relevant collective rights organization (“CRO”),10 and
in so doing, alter not only the rights and obligations under the law of the
parties themselves, but also potentially alter the rights and entitlements of
non-parties in several significant ways.
First, private copyright reform may deny artists royalty payments to
which they are legally entitled. Second, parties may misrepresent privately
negotiated valuations as representative of the market. Rate misrepresentation
(i.e., the introduction of a privately determined valuation as the “market”
rate, when in fact it represents only the specific parties’ interests) is prob-
lematic insofar as these misrepresentations are frequently adopted by the
industry, either formally through the Copyright Royalty Board’s (“CRB”) or
rate court’s rate setting processes, or informally through evolving industry
norms and customs.11 Finally, the adverse selection that leads larger,
stronger companies to opt out of the statutory license leaves smaller, less
powerful parties with a weaker, less effective statutory regime.
Unlike industries such as broadcast cable and satellite television,12
which operate under a mandatory statutory license that requires parties to
operate solely under the statute and to pay royalties directly to the Register
of Copyrights, the sound recording industry is governed by Section
9. The terms “statutory license” and “compulsory license” are often used interchangea-
bly. In this context, the descriptor “compulsory” can be misleading since it refers to the inabil-
ity of a licensor to refuse to license to a licensee who complies with the statutory terms; it does
not mean that compliance with the license is mandatory, as some such licenses—17 U.S.C.
§ 114 for the compulsory licensing of sound recordings, for example—explicitly authorize
circumvention, as detailed herein.
10. A collective rights organization (CRO) is an entity tasked with the collection and
administration of statutory royalties. In the sound recording industry, the sole CRO is
SoundExchange. The music publishing industry has specialized CROs, often referred to as
“performing rights organizations” or PROs (because they administer performing rights). The
three largest PROs, which together constitute the majority of the industry, are ASCAP, BMI,
and SESAC. Both ASCAP and BMI operate under consent decrees. See, e.g., United States v.
Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, Publishers, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999
(S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001) (renewing ASCAP’s consent decree).
11. The argument made herein—that industry norms are not necessarily efficient for
non-parties—builds upon a literature critiquing the use of norms and customs generally, both
within, and outside of, the intellectual property context. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, The Ques-
tionable Empirical Basis of Article 2’s Incorporation Strategy: A Preliminary Study, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 710 (criticizing the use of custom in the UCC context); Jennifer E. Rothman, The
Questionable Use of Custom in Intellectual Property, 93 VA. L. REV. 1899 (2007) (critiquing
the influence of custom on intellectual property law).
12. 17 U.S.C. § 111(d)(1) (establishing, in the case of broadcast cable, that “a cable
system whose secondary transmissions have been subject to statutory licensing. . .shall, on a
semiannual basis, deposit with the Register of Copyrights . . . [a] statement of account . . . “);
id. § 119(b)(1) (establishing, in the case of satellite transmissions, that “[a] satellite carrier
whose secondary transmissions are subject to statutory licensing . . . shall, on a semiannual
basis, deposit with the Register of Copyrights . . . [a] statement of account”).
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114(e)(1) of the Copyright Act of 197613 (the “Copyright Act”). This section
specifically contemplates an opt-out for licensors and licensees by authoriz-
ing “copyright owners of sound recordings” and “any entities performing
sound recordings” to alternately “negotiate and agree upon the royalty rates
and license terms and conditions for the performance of such sound record-
ings and the proportionate division of fees paid among copyright owners,
and may designate common agents on a nonexclusive basis to negotiate,
agree to pay, or receive payments.”14 This gives parties a choice: they can
utilize the compulsory licensing, or they can opt to engage in a private li-
censing deal.
Similarly, Section 115(c)(3)(B) of the Copyright Act authorizes volun-
tary negotiations for determining royalty rates and terms for musical compo-
sitions under the mechanical compulsory license: “[n]otwithstanding any
provision of the antitrust laws, any copyright owners of nondramatic musical
works and any persons entitled to obtain a statutory license . . . may negoti-
ate and agree upon the terms and rates of royalty payments under this para-
graph and the proportionate division of fees paid. . . .” Sound recordings and
musical compositions are therefore unique under the copyright laws in that
both operate under a circumventable compulsory license. Once circum-
vented, the statute’s terms no longer apply to the parties in any way. This
compulsory alternative, coupled with rampant instability and uncertainty
both as to royalty rates and business models in these industries, provides the
ideal setting for risk averse parties to experiment with private copyright
reform.
While Sections 114(e)(1) and 115(c)(3)(B) have allowed circumvention
in these industries for decades, parties have not taken advantage of the op-
portunity until now. Instead, licensors and licensees have always operated
under the respective compulsory license, and paid and collected their per-
formance royalties through a designated collective rights organization, like
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers (“ASCAP”) for
musical compositions, or SoundExchange for sound recordings. One expla-
nation for this adherence to the statutory license is simple: the negotiation of
individual content licenses with many different parties requires extensive,
and in many cases prohibitive, time and effort. In this way, compulsory li-
censes and CROs are generally understood to be efficient, and even neces-
sary, in industries that license intellectual property.
A primary impetus behind the establishment of Section 114, for exam-
ple, was the avoidance of high transaction costs associated with negotiation
13. Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
14. 17 U.S.C. § 114(e)(1).
6 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:1
of many individual content licensing deals.15 While the negotiation of indi-
vidual content licensing agreements is no less burdensome today than it was
twenty years ago, the music industry has changed drastically. It is unclear
whether the “facilitation of bulk licensing” explanation is wholly applicable
in the new, digital age where consumers are more concerned with access
than catalog.16 Instead, modern digital content services emphasize “curating
an ultimately limited selection,”17 a task best accomplished through private
ordering. This emphasis too may be a contributing factor to the emergence
of private copyright reform. Advances in technology, changes in consumer
behavior, failing business models, diminished profits, uncertainty surround-
ing future royalty rates, unpredictability around pending legislation and liti-
gation, and a propensity toward risk aversion all serve as impetuses for
private copyright reform.
Eager for stability, licensees and licensors in these industries are utiliz-
ing for the first time a statutory authorization for private deal making to alter
not only their own rights and responsibilities under the law via the establish-
ment of private royalty valuations, but also those of non-parties. For the
parties involved, these private deals better align incentives, save lobbying
costs, and encourage cooperation and growth in a way that the existing com-
pulsory licensing regime does not. This private copyright reform includes
both the creation of new rights and royalty obligations where none currently
exist, and the reduction or elimination of rights and royalty obligations oth-
erwise owed. This Article will focus on the latter.18
Part I highlights the volatile and unpredictable nature of copyright pro-
tection for music, and the music industry’s preference for risk avoidance, as
dual impetuses to private copyright reform. This reform, and the terms and
rights allocations that it establishes, suggest that the government is not the
only player in copyright reform, and perhaps not even the most important.
Left to free market negotiation, risk averse licensors and licensees are con-
tracting around compulsory licensing regimes and opting instead for pri-
15. See, e.g, Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 103 (1979) (finding that defaults, like a statutory license, minimize transaction
costs by mimicking what the parties would have wanted).
16. In other words, “[m]any consumers will say they want everything, but they actually
don’t.” Paul Resnikoff, If Only People Cared About ‘Comprehensive Catalogs’ and Millions of
Songs, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (May 14, 2013), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/
2013/20130514care; see also, e.g., Portia Krebs, Digital Music Sales Soaring, Thanks to
Streaming and Downloads, US TELECOM (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.ustelecom.org/blog/
digital-music-sales-soaring-thanks-streaming-and-downloads (comparing Spotify’s 16 million
songs to Pandora’s 1 million songs, and explaining Pandora’s greater commercial success:
“Pandora argues it’s quality, not quantity, that distinguishes their collection.”).
17. Id.
18. While certainly not limited to intellectual property, the field is rife with examples of
new rights creation in areas such as terrestrial broadcasting. This private rights creation is the
subject of a forthcoming piece that will examine this particular phenomenon and its implica-
tions for compulsory licensing.
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vately determined valuations. By so doing, they gain terms tailored to their
specific content and use, with greater flexibility and responsiveness than
possible under the current statutory licensing regime.
By permitting circumvention of not only the statutory license, but also
of the statutorily mandated distributions to artists, private copyright reform
raises serious distributive justice concerns by allowing for the reduction, and
even circumvention, of royalties to which songwriters, recording artists, mu-
sicians and vocalists are legally entitled. Unlike royalties collected and dis-
tributed by a CRO under 17 U.S.C. §§ 114-15, monies collected under
privately negotiated deals are not subject to the statutory distribution, and so
they are not required to be paid directly to artists or songwriters. The loss of
this income could have significant, immediate financial impact for recording
artists and songwriters, as well as long-term negative impact on creative
output.
Private copyright reform can also result in the misrepresentation of a
privately determined valuation as a “market” rate. This misrepresentation is
especially worrisome in industries such as sound recording and music pub-
lishing, where private values are often adopted by the industry—either for-
mally through the rate court’s or CRB’s rate setting procedure, or informally
through evolving industry norms. As a result, the private valuation of larger,
more powerful parties may come to dominate.
Thus, the potential for adverse effect on non-parties is not limited to
individual creators and consumers of content; smaller industry players and
potential new entrants are adversely affected as well. One of the driving
forces behind private copyright reform in the sound recording and music
publishing industries is the desire for a cooperative business partner.
Proliferation of these private deals among larger industry players will place
smaller parties and potential new entrants at a distinct disadvantage. Unable
to strike private deals, these smaller players will be left behind to operate
under the (arguably less desirable) compulsory licensing regime, or peer
pressured into acquiescing to unsustainable terms. At the same time, the loss
of administrative fees by CROs whose services are no longer being utilized
could severely cripple their ability to effectively serve the smaller members
and new entrants dependent upon them for collection of royalties and
administration.
Part II considers two examples of private copyright reform from each of
the sound recording and music publishing industries as case studies to moti-
vate an analysis of the significant move away from statutory copyright law
toward a privately determined and administered regime. This Part attempts
to explain this transition, to point out its shortcomings, to evaluate whether it
bolsters or undermines the current thinking around intellectual property
rights and copyright policy goals, and to raise awareness around the poten-
tial for abuse. In so doing, Part II offers a brief overview of what digital
performance rights are, how they work, and the challenges they present.
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Part III considers the normative implications of private copyright re-
form. These implications include both the adverse selection and distributive
justice concerns presented by statutory circumvention and private valuation,
as well as private copyright reform’s contribution to our broader doctrinal
understanding of intellectual property rights, compulsory licenses, and
CROs.
While not without its drawbacks, private copyright reform can bring
greater efficiency to content licensing in the form of tailored and responsive
deal terms. In recognition of the potential efficiency advantages, this Article
leaves the right to circumvent in place, but suggests that copyright’s goal of
promoting creation requires immutable artist protection. To this end, I pro-
pose a series of statutory amendments to address the distributive justice chal-
lenges presented by private copyright reform. First, I suggest the addition of
a fidelity clause requiring parties who circumvent the compulsory license to
adhere to the statutorily mandated distributions in order to obviate circum-
vention of statutory protections for non-parties. Second, I recommend the
inclusion of a full disclosure requirement for all private valuations presented
to the CRB or rate court for adoption as a means of avoiding misrepresenta-
tion of a private valuation as a “market” rate. As detailed in Part III, these
amendments, if adopted, would also serve to ameliorate the impact of ad-
verse selection.
Beyond distributive justice and misrepresentation in rate setting, recent
examples of private copyright reform in the sound recording and music pub-
lishing industries challenge the traditional understanding of compulsory li-
censes and CROs as optimally efficient mechanisms for content licensing,
and they build upon literature suggesting that the existence of a compulsory
license may in fact encourage private negotiation.19 The phenomenon of pri-
vate copyright reform also expands upon scholarship suggesting that risk
aversion creates extralegal intellectual property right entitlements20 by show-
ing that circumvention of statutory artist protections can alternately dimin-
ish, or even eliminate, such entitlements, while raising questions of fairness
around the ability of private parties to make law. While the resolution of
doctrinal questions about efficiency and private law making are outside the
scope of this Article, the proliferation of private copyright reform suggests
they may be ripe for reconsideration.
19. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033 (1995) (asserting that “liability rules
may induce both more contracting and more efficient contracting than property rules.”).
20. These “entitlements” come about where parties are unsure whether they need a li-
cense or not, and so secure one “just in case,” resulting in an industry custom to license
content where no such legal obligation exists. See James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights
Accretion in Intellectual Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882, 884 (2007) (discussing how “doc-
trinal gray areas” and “risk aversion . . . pervade[ ] key copyright industries” where the “result
is a practice of securing copyright licenses even where none is needed. Better safe than
sued.”).
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I. IMPETUSES FOR PRIVATE COPYRIGHT REFORM
While there are many possible explanations for the emerging private
copyright reform phenomenon, the three most likely impetuses include: (i)
increasing change and instability in the sound recording and music publish-
ing industries; (ii) legislative uncertainty about statutory rates and standards,
and resulting litigation; and (iii) the efficiency gains enjoyed by parties who
circumvent the statutory license in favor of private ordering.
A. Industrial Instability
Advances in technology and resultant changes in consumer behavior—
the shift from buying records to subscribing to music streaming services, for
example—have decimated traditional music industry business models. The
presentation and passage of the Digital Performance Right in Sound Record-
ings Act of 199521 (hereinafter, the “DPRA”) stemmed primarily from fear
of harm to record sales resulting from the availability of new digital music
services.22 Section 114(d)(2) of the DPRA calls for statutory licensing of
public performance rights for certain digital audio transmissions.23 To this
end, the Librarian of Congress has tasked the CRB with determining and
adjusting “reasonable terms and rates of royalty payments.”24 The CRB
holds hearings every five years to set the royalty rates for the subsequent
five-year period.25 While intended to improve responsiveness to ongoing
technological change, a royalty rate set to change every five years has done
nothing to lend stability or predictability to an industry already in turmoil.
To make matters worse, the CRB applies different standards in estab-
lishing digital performance royalty rates for different types of digital music
services. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998,26 (the “DMCA”)
establishes four categories of digital audio services: (1) preexisting subscrip-
21. Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-39,
109 Stat. 336 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. §§ 106, 114-15).
22. See Statement of Marybeth Peters, The Register of Copyrights Before the Subcomm.
on Courts and Intellectual Property Comm. on the Judicary, H.R. 1509, 104th Cong., (1st
session June 28, 1995) (noting that “[i]f record producers must risk having sales of pho-
norecords displaced by digital delivery direct to the consumer’s home from a ‘celestial juke-
box,’ those whose livelihoods depend on mechanical royalties on those phonorecords face the
same risk.”), available at http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat062895.html.
23. 17 U.S.C. §114(d)(2) (2012) holds, in relevant part, that “[t]he performance of a
sound recording publicly by means of a subscription digital audio transmission not exempt
under paragraph (1), an eligible nonsubscription transmission, or a transmission not exempt
under paragraph (1) that is made by a preexisting satellite digital audio radio service shall be
subject to statutory licensing.”
24. Id. § 801(b)(1).
25. Id. § 804(b)(1).
26. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat.
2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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tion digital audio services, such as Music Choice;27 (2) preexisting satellite
radio services, such as Sirius XM;28 (3) non-subscription digital audio ser-
vices, such as Pandora’s ad-supported radio service;29 and (4) subscription
digital audio services, such as Spotify’s premium tier service.30
The two categories of preexisting digital audio services are subject to
the standard set forth in Section 801(b)(1) of the Copyright Act (hereinafter,
the “801(b) standard”). The 801(b) standard considers the following factors
when setting a rate: maximization of availability of creative works to the
public; fair return to the copyright owner and fair income to the copyright
user; relative and technological contribution, capital investment, cost and
risk; and minimization of disruptive impact on the industries involved.31 By
contrast, the two categories of subscription and non-subscription digital au-
dio services, which include Internet radio services like Pandora, are subject
to rates set by the CRB under a standard intended to emulate fair market
value by looking at what a willing buyer and a willing seller would agree to
in a hypothetical marketplace32 (hereinafter, the “willing buyer, willing
seller” standard).
27. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(11) defines a “preexisting subscription service” as “a service that
performs sound recordings by means of noninteractive audio-only subscription digital audio
transmissions, which was in existence and was making such transmissions to the public for a
fee on or before July 31, 1988. . . .” For information about Music Choice and a description of
service offerings, see MUSIC CHOICE, http://www.musicchoice.com/ (last visited February 26,
2013).
28. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(10) defines a “preexisting satellite digital audio radio service” as
“a subscription satellite digital audio radio service provided pursuant to a satellite digital audio
radio service license issued by the Federal Communications Commission on or before July 31,
1998. . . .” For information about Sirius XM and a description of service offerings, see SIRIUS
XM, http://www.siriusxm.com/ (last visited February 26, 2013).
29. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(6). For information about Pandora and a description of service
offerings, see PANDORA, http://www.pandora.com/ (last visited February 26, 2013).
30. 17 U.S.C. § 114(j)(14). For information about Spotify and a description of service
offerings, see SPOTIFY, https://www.spotify.com/ (last visited February 26, 2013).
31. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(A)-(D).
32. 17 U.S.C. § 114(f)(2)(B) defines the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard as
follows:
In determining such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges shall base their
decision on economic, competitive and programming information presented by the
parties, including—
(i) whether use of the service may substitute for or may promote the sales of pho-
norecords or otherwise may interfere with or may enhance the sound recording cop-
yright owner’s other streams of revenue from its sound recordings; and
(ii) the relative roles of the copyright owner and the transmitting entity in the copy-
righted work and the service made available to the public with respect to relative
creative contribution, technological contribution, capital investment, cost, and risk.
In establishing such rates and terms, the Copyright Royalty Judges may consider the
rates and terms for comparable types of digital audio transmission services and com-
parable circumstances under voluntary license agreements. . . .
Fall 2013] Private Copyright Reform 11
Under the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard, Internet radio provid-
ers like Pandora currently pay more than 50% of their revenues in digital
performance royalties.33 The 801(b) standard, on the other hand, currently
yields royalty rates approaching 8% of revenues for satellite and cable audio
providers like Sirius XM and Music Choice,34 or roughly 1/6 of the total
reached under the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard:
PERFORMANCE ROYALTY RATES FOR SOUND RECORDINGS
Rate as an averageType of service Standard percentage of revenue
Preexisting 801(b) 7-8%(e.g., SiriusXM)
Post-1995 “willing buyer, 50-70%(e.g., Pandora) willing seller”
B. Legislative Unpredictability & Fallout Litigation
This inequality has led to the drafting and introduction of several pieces
of legislation, most recently the Internet Radio Fairness Act of 201235 (here-
inafter, the “Fairness Act”) and the Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today
(FIRST) Act (hereinafter, the “Interim Act”).36 Introduced in September
2012, the Fairness Act seeks, among other things, to resolve the six-fold
disparity in digital performance royalty rates between preexisting services
and others by essentially replacing the “willing buyer, willing seller” stan-
17 U.S.C. § 112(e)(4) also contains the “willing buyer, willing seller” language with regard to
ephemeral recordings.
33. See, e.g., Tim Westergren, Internet Radio Fairness Act, PANDORA, http://www.pan-
dora.com/static/ads/irfa/irfa.html (last visited Dec. 16, 2012) (“In 2011, Pandora paid over
50% of revenues in performance royalties.”).
34. See, e.g., David Oxenford, Copyright Royalty Board Oral Argument on Sirius XM
SoundExchange Royalties – A View of the Application of the 801(b) Standard Proposed for
Internet Radio, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Oct. 25, 2012), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/
tags/sirius-xm-music-royalties/ (discussing the debate between Sirius XM and SoundExchange
regarding whether the rate should increase or decrease from “the 8% of revenue that the ser-
vice now pays. . . .”) .
35. Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, H.R. 6480, 112th Cong. § 2 (2d Sess. 2012),
available at https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/112/hr6480/text (“To adopt fair standards
and procedures by which determinations of Copyright Royalty Judges are made with respect to
webcasting, and for other purposes”).
36. Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today Act of 2012, 112th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2012),
http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/files/documents/NADLER_153_xml.pdf (dis-
cussion draft).
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dard currently applied to Internet radio with the 801(b) standard currently
applied to cable and satellite providers.37
Proponents of the Fairness Act argue that because there is no true mar-
ket for Internet radio,38 the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard is not
only unfair, but also highly subjective. In a statement before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, the Digital Media Association, a trade association repre-
senting technology companies in the digital music space, explained the
“market” for digital performance licenses as a “fiction” and noted that “there
is no market for licensing these [digital performance] rights other than under
the statutory license itself,” because the performance right for sound record-
ings and the statutory license were created simultaneously.39 In response to
concerns about lowering royalties, proponents suggest that any initial de-
crease in revenue would be compensated by long-term growth in the indus-
try.40 There is also an antitrust argument: at current rates, proponents claim
that smaller webcasters will be driven out of business, leaving large broad-
casters to dominate the digital radio market as they have with terrestrial ra-
dio.41 As proof, the Fairness Act’s supporters make the historical case:
lacking the diversified portfolio of the large broadcasters, many small web-
casters were pushed from the market after a 2007 CRB rate hike.42
37. See Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012 § 3(a)(2) (suggesting removal of the “will-
ing buyer, willing standard” and replacement with “the objectives set forth in section
801(b)(1) . . . .”).
38. The industry has operated under a compulsory scheme since its inception.
39. See Supplemental Statement of the Digital Media Association Senate Judiciary
Committee Hearing on “Music and Radio in the 21st Century: Assuring Fair Rates and Rules
across Platforms”, DIGITAL MEDIA ASS’N (July 29, 2008), http://www.digmedia.org/compo-
nent/docman/doc_download/89-dimasupplemental-testimony; see also Senator Ron Wyden,
Summary of Internet Radio Fairness Act of 2012, U.S. SENATOR RON WYDEN (Sept. 21, 2012),
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/summary-of-internet-radio-fairness-act-of-2012 (not-
ing “[t]here is no functioning market for these licenses . . .” and that therefore the CRB judges
have “very little information to make reasonable conclusions.”).
40. Internet webcaster Pandora is one such company which has promised increased in-
vestment if granted a lower royalty rate. See, e.g., Tim Westergren, Pandora and Artist Pay-
ments, PANDORA (Oct. 9, 2012), http://blog.pandora.com/pandora/archives/2012/10/pandora-
and-art.html (“Making performance fees fair for internet radio will drive massive investment
in the space, accelerating the growth of the overall sector, and just as importantly accelerating
the development of new technology that leverages the incredible power of the internet to build
and activate new audiences. . . . The short-term reduction in revenue would be rapidly
swamped by the overall growth of the sector.”).
41. See, e.g., Hiawatha Bray, Internet Radio Firms Say Royalties Limiting Choices,
BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 14, 2008), available at http://msl1.mit.edu/furdlog/docs/b_globe/2008-
03-14_bglobe_internet_radio_royalties.pdf (“[Critics] warn of an online music industry domi-
nated by the same giant media companies that presently dominate traditional radio
broadcasting.”).
42. See id. (describing the closure of Internet radio start-up Mobile Beat Radio follow-
ing the CRB rate hike in January 2007 and warning of a repeat of terrestrial radio’s domination
in Internet radio by “the same giant media companies,” who will “push all of us [small broad-
casters] out of business.”).
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Opponents insist the existing rates are fair and accuse proponents of the
Fairness Act of seeking to take money away from artists. They argue that
moving Internet radio providers from a “willing buyer, willing seller” rate to
an 801(b) rate would effectively result in a government-mandated subsidy
that would enrich the Internet radio providers at the expense of artists, and
suggest it is the Internet radio business model, and not the digital perform-
ance royalty rate, that needs to change.43 Through the Recording Industry
Association of America (“RIAA”), the recording industry has been particu-
larly vocal in its opposition to the Fairness Act and instead supports the
Interim Act supported by Congressman Nadler (D) from New York.44 The
draft Interim Act asks the CRB to take into consideration the fact that terres-
trial broadcasters don’t pay a performance royalty on sound recordings when
determining the rate broadcasters should pay digitally.45 In other words, it
seeks compensation for the lack of a terrestrial performance right46 through
an increase in the digital performance rate. To that end, the bill would move
preexisting services from an 801(b) standard to a “willing buyer, willing
seller” standard.47
Opponents are quick to point out the hypocrisy of the recording industry
in seeking a different standard as licensors than they enjoy as licensees.
Mechanical license royalties under Section 115 of the Copyright Act are set
according to the 801(b) standard. Thus, as licensees of musical composi-
tions, record labels paying royalties to a songwriter or publisher benefit from
the lower rate determined under 801(b), while at the same time, as licensors
of sound recordings, they seek to benefit from the higher rate determined
under the “willing buyer, willing seller” standard.48
43. See, e.g., Songwriters and Music Publishers Call Foul on Pandora’s Efforts to Fur-
ther Lower Songwriter Compensation, NAT’L MUSIC PUBLISHERS ASS’N (Nov. 6, 2012), https:/
/www.nmpa.org/media/showwhatsnew.asp?id=74 (statement of NMPA CEO David Israelite)
(“It’s outrageous Pandora would try to reduce the already nominal amount they pay songwrit-
ers and music publishers, when Pandora’s business model is based entirely on the creative
contributions of those songwriters.”).
44. Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today Act of 2012, 112th Cong. (2d. Sess. 2012),
http://nadler.house.gov/sites/nadler.house.gov/files/documents/NADLER_153_xml.pdf.
45. See id. § 2, cl. 8–21 (discussion draft).
46. A terrestrial performance right gives a rights holder the right to collect royalties for
plays of a song on traditional FM/AM format radio, also known as “terrestrial” radio. As
discussed further herein, under the current copyright regime, only digital radio pays for plays;
FM/AM radio does not.
47. Interim Fairness in Radio Starts Today Act of 2012, cl. 8–21 (discussion draft).
48. See Internet Streaming of Radio Broads.: Balancing the Interests of Sound Record-
ing Copyright Owners with those of Broadcasters: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts,
the Internet and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004),
available at http://www.judiciary.house.gov/Legacy/potter071504.htm (testimony of Jonathan
Potter, Executive Director, Digital Media Association) (“There is also no principled basis why
the recording industry utilizes the traditional four-factor § 801(b) rate-setting standard when it
is a licensee in proceedings to set songwriters’ royalties, but benefits from the more favorable
willing buyer-willing seller standard when it is licensor in the Internet radio context.”).
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In support of the Interim Act, SoundExchange has looked to digital per-
formance royalty rates negotiated in the marketplace to suggest that rates
should in fact be higher.49 Citing the value of its talk programming and hard-
ware as “additional considerations” under an 801(b) standard evaluation,
preexisting satellite radio providers like Sirius XM counter that their rate
should in fact be lowered, and have pushed back with figures culled from
recent, direct licensing deals completed with over ninety artists and labels.50
SoundExchange has dismissed those deals as non-representative because
they were completed with small, independent labels and do not involve any
of the major label groups.51 Sirius XM has responded to those allegations
with a lawsuit alleging that interference from SoundExchange has prevented
them from negotiating with the major record labels.52
Sirius XM isn’t the only industry player utilizing lawsuits to endorse
pending legislation. In a suit recently filed in New York federal court, Pan-
dora has sued performance rights organization ASCAP for setting mechani-
cal royalty rates that are alleged to be “ill suited and not reasonable.”53 In its
complaint, Pandora insists that ASCAP’s current performance royalty rate
for musical compositions is based on an experimental form license from
2005 that was never intended to apply long-term.54 The parties have at-
tempted to negotiate a new rate for over a year without success.55 A deal was
reached, however, between ASCAP and the Radio Music Licensing Com-
mittee, an organization that includes among its members Pandora competitor
iHeart Radio,56 a division of media conglomerate Clear Channel. That deal
sets a blanket license rate of 1.7% of gross revenues, less a standard deduc-
tion from the applicable revenue base of 25% for new media offerings
(which includes Internet radio).57 Pandora’s complaint alleges that ASCAP
has refused to extend them the same terms.58
49. See Oxenford, supra note 34 (“SoundExchange contended that the rates should go
up significantly from the 8% of revenue that the service now pays.”).
50. Id.
51. Id. Interestingly, no one has questioned the presentation of a mere ninety deals (in a
pool of thousands) as representative of the market.
52. See Complaint Jury Trial Demanded at 32-33, Sirius XM Radio Inc. v.
SoundExchange, Inc., (No. 12-CV-2259) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2012).
53. Petition of Pandora Media, Inc. for the Determination of Reasonable License Fees at
3, Pandora Media, Inc. v. United States, (No. 12-8035 (DLC) (MHD)) (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5,
2012). In accordance with the consent decree under which ASCAP functions, the federal dis-
trict court for the Southern District of New York currently functions as the rate court for
setting performance royalties for musical compositions. See United States v. Am. Soc’y of
Composers, Authors, Publishers, No. 41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y.
June 11, 2001).
54. See Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., supra note 53, at 3.
55. Id. at 4.
56. IHEARTRADIO, http://www.iheart.com (last visited Feb. 27, 2013).
57. Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., supra note 53, at 4-5.
58. Id. at 6; see also Don Jeffrey, Pandora Media Sues ASCAP Seeking Lower Song-
writer Fees, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 5, 2012), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-11-05/pan-
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Pandora further asserts that a lower rate is appropriate now that AS-
CAP’s largest music publisher client—the newly-combined EMI and Sony/
ATV—is withdrawing its content from ASCAP, making ASCAP’s catalog
inherently less valuable, and requiring Pandora to expend additional time
and money to directly license that content.59 Sony/ATV has justified its
withdrawal from ASCAP by making the same rate disparity argument that
Pandora is making in its support of the Fairness Act. According to a top
publishing executive at Sony/ATV, “Pandora pays record labels $12.50 for
every $1 paid to songwriters and music publishers. . . . It is the worst divi-
sion of content payments for songwriters in any form of the music business.
Sony/ATV is attempting to improve that horrible ratio.”60 In other words,
Sony/ATV believes it can negotiate a better rate than ASCAP,61 despite the
fact that ASCAP is being simultaneously sued for having a rate that is both
“ill-suited” and “unreasonable.”62
In the face of all of this uncertainty and unpredictability surrounding
digital performance royalty rates, some industry players have (unsurpris-
ingly) opted out of the compulsory regime altogether. Part II will consider
the structure of this private copyright reform, and potential concerns arising
from it, through consideration of two examples, one from each of the sound
recording and music publishing industries.
C. Efficiency Gains
Perhaps the strongest impetus for private copyright reform is its ability
to improve upon the inefficiencies of the statutory license. This includes
improved cooperation and incentive alignment, tailored and predictable rate
setting, rapid accommodation of changes in technology and consumer pref-
erences, and value differentiation for different content and uses.
dora-media-sues-ascap-seeking-lower-songwriter-fees.html (“This year Ascap [sic] negotiated
a fee agreement with the Radio Music Licensing Committee, which represents large broadcast-
ers such as . . . Clear Channel. They will pay 1.7 percent of gross revenue minus deductions
based on advertising commissions. Pandora said in its lawsuit that Ascap [sic] refused to offer
it the same terms. Clear Channel operates the iHeartRadio Internet service, a direct competitor
to Pandora.”).
59. See Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., supra note 53, at 6-9.
60. Paul Resnikoff, Pandora Is Now Suing ASCAP to Lower Songwriter Royalties, DIGI-
TAL MUSIC NEWS (Nov. 6, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2012/121105
ascap.
61. So far, Sony/ATV appears correct in this belief. On January 17, 2013, they signed a
direct licensing deal with Pandora for a digital performance rate 25% higher than ASCAP’s
going rate. See, e.g., Sony/ATV Negotiates 25% Royalty Increase from Pandora: Report, BILL-
BOARD BIZ (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/publishing/1510421/
sonyatv-negotiates-25-royalty-increase-from-pandora-report.
62. Glenn Peoples, Pandora Sues ASCAP for Lower Rates, BILLBOARD BIZ (Nov. 6,
2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/legal-and-management/pandora-sues-ascap-
for-lower-rates-1008003232.story.
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The statutory license for sound recordings, 17 U.S.C. § 114, sets a per-
play rate that misaligns incentives between licensees and licensors. In the
case of sound recordings, for example, record labels want as much airtime as
possible to promote their artists and boost album sales, while a per-play
royalty encourages broadcasters to minimize costs by playing as little music
as possible.63 In contrast, a rate set as a share of revenues—common in pri-
vate copyright deals, as discussed in Part II infra—encourages more plays,
which in turn induces more listeners, which ultimately leads to a higher per-
ad rate since advertisers will pay more for ads they believe will reach a
bigger audience.64
Unlike the statutory license, private copyright reform also encourages a
mutually cooperative relationship between the parties involved. This is a
challenging time for copyright holders in the content industries65 as piracy
continues to rise, and revenues continue to fall.66 A terrestrial broadcaster
looking to expand into digital radio, and to grow its market share there, for
example, stands to benefit from a cooperative relationship with digital con-
tent owners. These relationships may afford broadcasters early and exclusive
content, with which they can use to attract both advertisers and listeners. A
revenue share also allows both parties to share in the upside and downside of
a business venture. This marks a significant departure from, and improve-
ment on, the music industry’s standard digital model consisting of either an
equity requirement67 or an exorbitant advance for the licensor, with no con-
sequence from—or responsibility for—the fate of the licensee.68
63. See Ed Christman, Exclusive: Clear Channel, Big Machine Strike Deal to Pay
Sound-Recording Performance Royalties to Label, Artists, BILLBOARD BIZ (June 5, 2012, 7:00
AM), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/1094776/exclusive-clear-channel-big-ma-
chine-strike-deal-to-pay-sound-recording (quoting broadcasting CEO Bill Pittman as saying: “I
don’t want to try and guess how much advertising I can sell. . . . It encourages us to try and
play as little music as possible.”).
64. There is a trade-off: Each additional play reduces the time available for running paid
advertising. The key in this model is to charge more for less; i.e., to charge more per ad, but
run fewer ads.
65. The “content industries” typically include music, television, film, and publishing.
66. See, e.g., Paul Resnikoff, Album Sales Sink to Their Lowest Levels Since 1991 . . .,
DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/11/
01/weeklyalbum; Mark Sweney, Global Recorded Music Sales Fall Almost $1.5bn amid In-
creased Piracy, GUARDIAN (March 28, 2011), available at http://www.theguardian.com/busi-
ness/2011/mar/28/global-recorded-music-sales-fall.
67. See, e.g., Michael Arrington, Confirmed: MySpace to Launch New Music Venture
with Big Labels, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 2, 2008), http://techcrunch.com/2008/04/02/myspace-to-
launch-new-music-joint-venture-with-big-labels/ (describing the distribution of monies to eq-
uity-holding copyright owners). The MySpace Music venture folded in 2011.
68. See, e.g., Paul Resnikoff, So Turntable.fm Just Got Its Label Licenses. R.I.P. Turn-
table.fm?, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Mar. 13, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2012/120312turntable (discussing digital start-up Turntable.fm’s struggle with in-
different and disinterested content licensors).
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Private copyright reform is also considerably more responsive than the
statutory regime at addressing the rapid changes in technology inherent in
the content industries. This is because private deals are relatively easily and
cheaply revised. If one party wants to run a trial of a new type of service, it
need simply negotiate a trial rate and term with the content owner, who has
every incentive to cooperate now that it shares in the revenues.
Finally, all parties under a statutory license pay the same rate, regardless
of the use, or even the particular content. Private copyright reform, on the
other hand, allows for tailoring of terms to fit the contemplated content and
use, thereby alleviating concerns presented by the one-size-fits-all nature of
a statutory licensing regime in which all content of a particular genre is
subject to the same rate, regardless of merit or use, and in which the market
is unable to differentiate among different valuations. In this way, private
ordering supports the creation and dissemination of the “best” (i.e., most
valuable) content, as determined by the market, thereby producing more de-
sirable outcomes insofar as the parties are (at least in theory) constrained by
the discipline of a competitive market.
In sum, private copyright reform improves efficiency for the parties in-
volved. But do these efficiency gains extend to non-parties? To societal wel-
fare? The next Part will consider these questions in the context of two case
studies demonstrating private copyright reform in action.
II. CONTRACTING AROUND COMPULSORY LICENSES, OPTING OUT OF
COLLECTIVE RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS, & MAKING PRIVATE
VALUATIONS LAW: A CASE STUDY IN PRIVATE COPYRIGHT REFORM
Although private copyright reform, as herein defined, could conceivably
take place in any industry with a circumventable compulsory license, the
sound recording and music publishing industries are particularly susceptible
to private deal making given their rampant instability and unpredictability.
This is especially true in the case of performance rights, offering an ideal
case study in the causes and effects of private copyright reform. The first
example—a private agreement to circumvent the compulsory license for dig-
ital performance rights—is a direct result of the disparity and uncertainty
surrounding these rights, and it exemplifies the distributive injustice made
possible by private copyright reform. The second example involves circum-
vention of a CRO and establishment of a private performance royalty that
results in both reduced royalties to songwriters and misrepresentation of a
private valuation as representative of the market rate.
A. Break-ups & Distributive Injustice
In order to appreciate the controversy and import around performance
rights, it is helpful to understand that any song played on the radio is pro-
tected by two distinct copyrights: one on the underlying musical composi-
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tion69 (this is known as the “mechanical” right) and one on the aural
representation of that composition70 (this is known as the “master” right).
The latter constitutes a sound recording, popularly termed a “song” or a
“track.” Recording artists typically assign their copyrights in sound record-
ings, or master rights (in whole or in part) to record labels, while songwriters
typically assign their copyrights in compositions or mechanical rights (in
whole or in part) to music publishing companies. As a result, different par-
ties generally hold the rights to these two copyrights (neither of which is
typically the artist herself). Big Machine artist Taylor Swift’s recent hit sin-
gle “We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together,”71 for example, is protected
by two separate copyrights: a copyright on the composition, held by Taylor
Swift, Max Martin and Shellback as songwriters, and their music publishing
company, Sony/ATV; and a separate copyright on the sound recording held
by Taylor Swift, as recording artist, and her record label, Big Machine:72
If another recording artist wants to record a cover version of “We Are
Never Ever Getting Back Together,” he would need to obtain a mechanical
license for use of the composition. The cover artist could then obtain a sepa-
rate copyright on his own cover recording, or master. Thus, there can be
many different masters (i.e., sound recordings) of the same song, but still
only one composition. In addition, many different composers or songwriters
can contribute to any given composition, and several different recording art-
ists—both featured and non-featured73—can contribute to any given sound
recording. The corresponding industries servicing musical compositions and
sound recordings are the music publishing and record industries,
respectively.
Under the current U.S. copyright regime, a third right–that of exclusive
public performance–has derived from the mechanical and master rights. This
public performance right affords the holder the exclusive right to perform
the work publicly, and attaches both digitally (i.e., online) and terrestrially
(i.e., via traditional broadcast radio) as to compositions, but digitally only as
to sound recordings. Therefore, a spin of Taylor Swift’s “We Are Never
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) (2012).
70. Id. § 102(a)(7).
71. TAYLOR SWIFT, We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together, on RED (Big Machine
Records 2012). While hardly her first hit, “We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together” enjoys
the distinction of being the fastest selling digital single to date, with over 623,000 downloads
in its first hour of release. See, e.g., Chase Hunt, Taylor Swift’s New Single Makes Digital
History on Hot 100, EXAMINER (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.examiner.com/article/taylor-
swift-s-new-single-makes-digital-history-on-hot-100.
72. Big Machine Label Group is a Nashville, Tennessee-based independent record label
whose roster includes Taylor Swift, Rascal Flatts and Reba McEntire. See BIG MACHINE
RECORDS, http://www.bigmachinelabelgroup.com/ (last visited February 27, 2013).
73. Typically, a “featured” recording artist is the artist or band whose name appears on
the record. Band members, session musicians and back-up vocalists are generally categorized
as “non-featured.”
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TWO COPYRIGHTS FOR THE SONG “WE ARE NEVER EVER GETTING
BACK TOGETHER”
Ever Getting Back Together” on a local broadcast radio station would re-
quire a performance royalty be paid to the songwriter and/or owner of the
mechanical copyright (in this case, Taylor Swift, Max Martin, Shellback
and/or Sony/ATV Publishing); no royalty would be paid to the recording
artist and/or owner of the sound recording (i.e., Taylor Swift and/or Big
Machine).74 A spin of the same track on an Internet radio station like Pan-
dora, however, would require royalties be paid to both. A spin of yet again
the same track on a preexisting satellite radio station, like Sirius XM, also
requires royalties be paid to both, but the sound recording incurs a signifi-
cantly lower rate (the composition rate remains the same):
74. As discussed in this Part, most recording artists and songwriters assign their copy-
rights, in whole or in part, to record labels or music publishers, respectively. The royalties are
administered accordingly.
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2013 PERFORMANCE ROYALTY RATES FOR SOUND RECORDINGS BY
SERVICE TYPE
Format Digital Digital Terrestrial
Preexisting Satellite Pureplay Internet BroadcastService Type Radio Service radio service
radio station(e.g. Sirius XM) (e.g. Pandora)
Performance $0.00121/plan +10% of revenues75 None77Royalty Rate 25% of revenues76
The inequality between digital and terrestrial performance royalties for
sound recordings has long been a point of contention between the sound
recording and broadcast industries.78 In the June 2012 deal struck between
Taylor Swift’s record label, Big Machine, and Clear Channel Communica-
tions, Inc. (“Clear Channel”),79 the parties agreed to a lower digital rate in
exchange for, among other things, the establishment of a terrestrial perform-
75. See David Oxenford, Full Text of Copyright Royalty Board Decision on Sirius XM
and Music Choice Royalties Released – The Basics of the Decision, BROADCAST LAW BLOG
(Jan. 4, 2013), http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2013/01/articles/full-text-of-copyright-
royalty-board-decision-on-sirius-xm-and-music-choice-royalties-released-the-basics-of-the-
decision/.
76. See David Oxenford, Final Webcasting Royalty Rates Published – A Comparison of
How Much Various Services Pay, BROADCAST LAW BLOG (Mar. 14, 2011), http://www.
broadcastlawblog.com/2011/03/articles/internet-radio/final-webcasting-royalty-rates-
published-a-comparison-of-how-much-various-services-pay/.
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2012) (granting an exclusive right, “in the case of sound
recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio
transmission”) (emphasis added).
78. Broadcasters have always resisted a performance right for sound recordings on the
basis that their programming provides a valuable promotional service to artists and record
labels, and as such they should not have to pay. Music publishers, worried that the creation of
a performance right for sound recordings would cut into the performance royalties they were
entitled to receive from broadcasters, teamed up with broadcasters to successfully block a
performance right for sound recordings from the 1976 Act. It would be another thirty years
before a performance right for sound recordings would finally be instituted. See, e.g., John R.
Kettle III, Dancing to the Beat of a Different Drummer: Global Harmonization and the Need
for Congress to Get in Step with a Full Public Performance Right for Sound Recordings, 12
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1041, 1053 (2000) (discussing the NAB’s opposi-
tion to a performance right for sound recordings and noting that “[j]oining the NAB’s position
against a full public performance right for sound recordings are songwriters, music publishers,
and performing rights societies. They claim it is the songwriter and music publisher who will
lose a substantial portion of income.”).
79. Clear Channel Communications, Inc. is a national broadcast and digital media pro-
vider based in Texas. See CLEAR CHANNEL COMMC’NS, INC., http://www.clearchannel.com/
Pages/Home.aspx (last visited February 27, 2013).
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ance right.80 They also settled on a royalty rate calculated as a share of reve-
nue, to be paid directly from Clear Channel to Big Machine, in lieu of the
statutory, per-play royalty rate paid to SoundExchange under the compul-
sory license.81 This direct payment circumvents the direct payment to Taylor
Swift that would otherwise be made under the statutory license. The statu-
tory distribution of royalties is laid out in 17 U.S.C. § 114(g)(2) of the Copy-
right Act:
• 50% of receipts shall be paid to the copyright owner;
• 2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account for dis-
tribution to non-featured musicians;
• 2.5% of receipts shall be deposited in an escrow account for
non-featured vocalists; and
• 45% of receipts shall be paid to the featured recording artist on
the sound recording.
This statutory distribution scheme accomplishes two related goals. First,
the statute provides royalty disbursement directly to creators, as opposed to
intermediary copyright holders. It also provides payment for a tradition-
ally—and frequently—unrepresented and disadvantaged class of non-fea-
80. The introduction of a terrestrial performance right is significant not only for the fact
that Clear Channel has no legally obligation to pay it, but also for the fact that “[t]errestrial
radio still accounts for 98% of U.S. radio’s music advertising revenue.” Dan Rys, Clear Chan-
nel Inks Second Radio Royalties Label Deal, This Time with Glassnote, BILLBOARD BIZ (Sept.
27, 2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/radio/clear-channel-inks-second-radio-roy-
alties-1007962302.story#PQdPtv2bJYdOM5RR.99.
81. Since the signing of the Big Machine-Clear Since the signing of the Big Machine-
Clear Channel deal in June 2012, nearly a dozen copycat deals have been completed. See, e.g.,
Ed Christman, Big Machine Cuts Deal with Beasley Broadcasting to Share ‘Certain’ Revenue,
BILLBOARD BIZ (Feb. 5, 2013), http://www.billboard.com/biz/articles/news/legal-and-manage-
ment/1537936/big-machine-cuts-deal-with-beasley-broadcasting-to (describing a deal “which
will bring terrestrial performance royalties to its artists in exchange for more predictable rates
for its digital broadcasting.”); Priscilla Kim, Clear Channel Inks Another Direct Licensing
Deal (This Time, With Fearless Records), DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (June 3, 2013) http://www.
digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/20130603ccmeandfearlessrecords; Glenn Peoples, Big
Machine Label Group Signs Terrestrial Royalties Deal with Entercom, BILLBOARD BIZ (Sept.
20, 2012), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry/record-labels/big-machine-label-group-
signs-terrestrial-1007954192.story#mjSF3atSRlbIYMil.99 (describing the Big Machine-En-
tercom deal and quoting Entercom President and CEO David Field as calling the deal “a bold
step forward to align our interests with those of Big Machine and their artists.”); Rys, supra
note 80 (describing the Clear Channel-Glassnote deal and quoting Glassnote Founder/CEO
Daniel Glass describing the deal as a “partnership [that] aligns our business interests more
closely with Clear Channel.”). The model has become so prevalent, in fact, that naysayers have
begun discouraging opt-in: “Instead of deserting all the hard work that was put into setting up
SoundExchange . . . American musicians and labels should stick together and push even harder
to extend collective licensing to terrestrial radio.” Helienne Lidvall, Should Labels Bypass
SoundExchange and Enter Into Direct Deals With Clear Channel?, DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS
(May 3, 2013), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/2013/20130503bypass.
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tured artists. This distribution scheme is important insofar as a goal of
copyright law is to encourage creation by providing artists with a means of
making a living.82
Under the statutory license, Clear Channel would pay SoundExchange
$0.002283 for each spin of Taylor Swift’s record “We Are Never Ever Get-
ting Back Together” on its iHeart Radio digital subscription service.84
SoundExchange would then deduct its administrative fee85 and distribute the
remaining royalties directly to featured and non-featured artists, and to the
copyright holder. In this example, Taylor Swift is the featured recording
artist, Max Martin and Shellback are the non-featured artists, and Big Ma-
chine is the copyright holder.86
Under their private deal, Clear Channel and Big Machine circumvent
not only the compulsory license, but also this statutory distribution, thereby
avoiding direct payments to artists, musicians and vocalists. Given Clear
Channel’s position as the nation’s radio broadcasting company, this is no
small loss for Taylor and company.87 Importantly, the detrimental effects on
non-parties—in this case, Taylor Swift as recording artist—are legally bind-
ing, and contradict the provisions and intentions of the circumvented statute.
Specifically, the agreement potentially denies artists royalties to which they
are legally entitled.88
In addition, the privately established royalties are paid directly from
Clear Channel to Big Machine, circumventing not only the Section 114(g)(2)
82. There is debate in the academic literature regarding the proper goal(s) and scope of
authority under Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, which authorizes Con-
gress to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries,” how-
ever, there is a general consensus around the goal of artist compensation. See generally, David
S. Olson, A Legitimate Interest in Promoting the Progress of Science: Constitutional Con-
straints on Copyright Laws, 64 VAND. L. REV. 185 (2011) (discussing Congress’ authority and
limitations under this Clause).
83. For 2013, $0.0022 is the broadcasters’ performance royalty rate for sound record-
ings. See Oxenford, supra note 75.
84. Notably, Clear Channel would pay nothing to SoundExchange for a spin of the same
track on one of its terrestrial radio stations. See Jeffrey, supra note 58.
85. In 2011, the latest year for which this information is currently available,
SoundExchange charged an administrative fee of 5.3%. See SOUNDEXCHANGE ANNUAL RE-
PORT FOR 2011 PROVIDED PURSUANT TO 37 C.F.R. § 370.5(D) at 8, available at http://www.
soundexchange.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/2011-Annual-Report.pdf.
86. See credits from CD single liner notes for TAYLOR SWIFT, We Are Never Ever Get-
ting Back Together, on RED (Big Machine Records 2012).
87. See PUBLIC RADIO CAPITAL, RESOURCE GUIDE: THE CASE FOR MORE CHANNELS,
MORE SERVICE 10 (April 2005), http://www.publicradiocapital.org/pdf/MCMSResource
Guide4202005.pdf (noting that “Clear Channel, the largest commercial station entity, owns
more than 1,100 stations (including up to the maximum of eight stations in most of the major
markets).”).
88. In the interest of considering the full picture, Section 114(g)(2)’s mandatory distri-
bution could alternately be viewed as itself a detriment to artists insofar as intermediaries may
discount the advances they are willing to offer in light of this ex ante royalty reduction.
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distribution, but also SoundExchange’s role as a CRO.89 This prevents
SoundExchange from collecting the administrative fee to which it is legally
entitled. The loss of administrative fees owed to SoundExchange is signifi-
cant not only for its effect of denying the CRO its legally entitled monies,
but also for the potential effect on other, smaller members should the Big
Machine-Clear Channel deal become accepted as an industry norm. For ex-
ample, if licensee Pandora—an Internet radio service whose royalty fees
constituted nearly 40% of SoundExchange’s non-interactive revenue and
70% of SoundExchange’s year-over-year revenue gains in 201190—decides
to follow in Clear Channel’s footsteps and negotiate privately with its licen-
sors, it could spell the end for SoundExchange, the sound recording indus-
try’s sole CRO. At the very least, loss of a significant portion of
administrative revenues could severely impact SoundExchange’s ability to
effectively serve its remaining members.
The capacity for private copyright reform to influence industry norms
exacerbates the distributive justice concerns owing directly to statutory cir-
cumvention. The Big Machine-Clear Channel deal, for example, involves a
large broadcaster licensee with sufficient market influence to entice coopera-
tion from a smaller, but still significant, licensor. Smaller, local, or start-up
broadcasters without comparable bargaining power are left to the compul-
sory scheme, or worse, to be peer pressured into unsustainably high “mar-
ket” rates. To the extent that the bargain struck by Clear Channel features a
lower digital performance royalty rate and affords them exclusive or early
access to content, this puts the smaller broadcasters at a disadvantage with
respect to the ability to attract both listeners and advertisers. This disadvan-
tage comes on top of the challenges they already face as a result of smaller
market share and market cap. The same goes for other licensors insofar as
the fact that Big Machine has agreed to forego its statutory right to a per-
play royalty—at an implied loss91—entitles its artists to preferential treat-
ment by the broadcasters.92
89. See, e.g., Christman, supra note 63 (“[S]ince the deal is a negotiated rate, payments
will bypass SoundExchange and be made directly to the label[.]”).
90. See Rocco Pendola, The Future of Royalty Fees: Another Piece of the Pandora Bull
Case, SEEKING ALPHA (Apr. 11, 2012), http://seekingalpha.com/article/492621-the-future-of-
royalty-fees-another-piece-of-the-pandora-bull-case (citing calculations indicating that “Pan-
dora accounted for nearly 37% of SoundExchange’s 2011 revenues, up from an already-high
23.5% in 2010 . . . nearly 70% of SoundExchange’s year-over-year revenue gains are attributa-
ble to Pandora, and Pandora’s revenue commitments to SoundExchange more than doubled
over the past year.”).
91. See Christman, supra note 63 (quoting Big Machine’s Borchetta acknowledging of
the agreed valuation that when the numbers come out, “we will take some criticism; that is
expected. The first one through the door takes the arrow,” but insisting that “this is a ‘starting
point.’”).
92. To the extent that Big Machine’s foregoing of its legal entitlement to a per-play
royalty can be viewed as “buying” preferential treatment for its artists, this also raises potential
payola concerns. Payola, or the payment of monies to secure airplay of a track, is governed by
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In other words, the success of Clear Channel and Big Machine’s bargain
may “peer pressure” other industry players into agreeing to the same or simi-
lar terms, thereby establishing an industry norm. Those who do not, or can-
not, match terms will be disadvantaged vis-a`-vis the parties who are willing
and able to do so. Licensees who do not agree to grant Big Machine and
similarly situated licensors a terrestrial performance right, for example, may
miss out on exclusive content. Likewise, licensors who will not accept lower
digital royalties—perhaps because their roster is comprised of mostly digital
artists—may be disadvantaged when it comes to securing preferential pro-
motional opportunities. If unable to offer Big Machine the same terms, for
example, a smaller broadcaster may be passed over for an exclusive inter-
view with Taylor Swift, making it even more difficult for them to compete
with the likes of Clear Channel for advertisers.
A focus solely on the potential, detrimental effects of private copyright
reform, however, misses the bigger picture. For one thing, private copyright
reform can bring stability to an otherwise volatile situation. If passed, the
Fairness Act would reduce artist and record label revenues by roughly 40%,
whereas passage of the Interim Act would increase the digital performance
royalty rate paid by cable and satellite providers nearly six-fold. Even if
neither act passes in its current form, digital performance rates are scheduled
to change every five years, and industry-wide support (and contempt) for the
concepts embodied in these acts promises ongoing attempts at substantive
rate adjustment in the future. The Big Machine-Clear Channel deal avoids
all of this uncertainty by setting its own, non-fluctuating rate that is unaf-
fected by the outcome of proposed legislation and pending litigation.
The predictability afforded parties to private copyright reform is espe-
cially attractive from a broadcasters’ point of view. For Clear Channel, ne-
gotiation of a private royalty valuation has several advantages, chief among
them the opportunity to shake the specter of the per-play royalty. In addition
to potentially lowering their overall digital performance royalties exposure, a
revenue share approach allows a broadcaster to build a more predictable
digital business model than under a per-play rate.93 In the words of Clear
Channel CEO Bob Pittman, “I can’t build a business space based on paying
money for every time I play a song, but I can build a business by saying I
will give a percentage of revenue that I bring in. . . . What we are really
47 U.S.C. §§ 317, 508. Those sections require disclosure of any such payment received by a
radio station, by whom, when and in what amount. The “cooperation” induced by the Clear
Channel-Big Machine deal would not be subject to this requirement.
93. Although the Pureplay Agreement includes a percentage-of-revenue option, a licen-
see’s rate derives from a greater-of formula, which places all of the major broadcasters under
the per-play option. See Notification of Agreements Under the Webcaster Settlement Act of
2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796, 34,798 (July 17, 2009). The term “pureplay” refers to businesses
engaged solely, or “purely” in the business of Internet radio.
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trying to do is come up with a predictable model.”94 By offering Big Ma-
chine a percentage of advertising revenues, Clear Channel rids itself of the
economic unpredictability inherent in a per-play royalty rate, especially a
fluctuating one.
For both broadcasters and record labels, the incentives under a per-play
rate are misaligned. A per-play royalty encourages broadcasters to minimize
costs by playing as little music as possible,95 while record labels want as
much airtime as possible to promote their artists. A royalty valuation as a
share of revenue, in contrast, may encourage more spins, since each addi-
tional spin may be used to attract additional listeners and potential advertis-
ers. More spins also mean more promotion for record labels, who are
encouraged to offer broadcasters more—and even exclusive—content,
which further attracts advertisers, leading to greater revenues for both broad-
caster and record label.
The Big Machine-Clear Channel deal accomplishes another important
goal at which the existing compulsory licensing scheme fails: it fosters a
mutually cooperative relationship between parties whose businesses are in-
terdependent. While terrestrial radio continues its decline,96 digital radio is
experiencing exponential growth. Digital radio advertising revenues are ex-
pected to grow from $713 million in 2011 to $1.55 billion in 2021, or from
1.5% of broadcaster revenues in 2007 to over 7% by the end of 2021.97
Internet-only radio is forecast to grow even faster, from a current market cap
of roughly $293 million to over $1 billion by the end of 2021.98 A broad-
caster looking to establish and grow its digital market share, then, is best
served by cooperative relationships with content owners—relationships that
afford them early and exclusive content in order to attract both advertisers
and listeners.
94. See Christman, supra note 63.
95. Id. (statement of Clear Channel CEO Pittman) (“I don’t want to try and guess how
much advertising I can sell—and if it’s not coming in fast enough, can I slow down the song
plays? Or should I do an interview show, or do more talk radio and news and sports, or maybe
do more pre-1972 music programming? That’s just a bad way to run—and even more impor-
tantly, try and build—a business. It encourages us to try and play as little music as possible.”).
96. See, e.g., Richard Siklos, Changing Its Tune, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 15, 2006), http://
www.nytimes.com/2006/09/15/business/media/15radio.html?ex=1158897600&en=3ec38c17f
8408ff2&ei=5099&partner=TOPIXNEWS&_r=0 (“[T]he prospects of radio companies have
dimmed significantly since the late 1990’s, when broadcast barons were tripping over them-
selves to buy more stations. Radio revenue growth has stagnated and the number of listeners is
dropping. The amount of time people tune into radio over the course of a week has fallen by
14 percent over the last decade, according to Arbitron ratings. Over the last three years, the
stocks of the five largest publicly traded radio companies are down between 30 percent and 60
percent. . . .”).
97. SNL KAGAN, ECONOMICS OF INTERNET MUSIC & RADIO 2 (2011) (on file with
author).
98. Id.
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Record labels are also eager to expand their revenue opportunities. Ad-
vances in digital technology, such as streaming, and resultant changes in
consumer behavior have decimated traditional recording industry business
models, forcing these licensors to seek revenues in greener pastures—
namely in radio, which is often still credited with encouraging record sales.99
A cooperative relationship with broadcasters may ensure better product
placement and more opportunities for content owners to share in the growth
of digital radio. In addition, the revenue share established by the Big Ma-
chine-Clear Channel deal sets up a cooperative partnership in which the par-
ties share both the risk and the upside. This is a significant departure from
the industry’s standard digital deal consisting of either an equity require-
ment,100 or an exorbitant advance for the content owner(s), with no conse-
quence from, or responsibility for, the fate of the licensee.101
Statutory licensing regimes are commonly believed to reflect the indus-
try bargain, or at least to set the baseline for private deal making. In the case
of digital performance royalties, however, the existing compulsory licensing
regime does neither. Instead of looking to the statutory per-play rate as a
guideline, Clear Channel and Big Machine have rejected the compulsory rate
as wholly unfit for their purposes.
Similarly, CROs are traditionally thought to be beneficial for copyright
owners as a means of increasing bargaining power, and for establishing and
enforcing a collective valuation.102 The direct payment from Clear Channel
to Big Machine challenges this assumption by obviating the need for a CRO;
in this case, SoundExchange. In addition to saving on administrative costs,
the parties control distribution of the royalties and are not held to the Section
114(g)(2) distribution. This means they do not have to pay any royalties
directly or indirectly to any artist, featured or non-featured. This is not an
isolated rejection: Sony/ATV’s withdrawal from ASCAP, discussed in the
next example, also suggests that the CRO model may not meet the needs of
licensors and licensees in a digital world.
99. See, e.g., Kristen Thomas, Does Radio Airplay Matter?, ARTIST REVENUE STREAMS
(May 7, 2012), http://money.futureofmusic.org/does-radio-airplay-matter/ (“[N]ew forms of
radio are providing airplay opportunities for more musicians and more types of music. . . .
Radio airplay contributes to an artists’ brand. . . . For some musicians, airplay is perceived as a
major driver of record sales and other revenue streams. . . .”).
100. See, e.g., Arrington, supra note 67 (describing the distribution of monies to equity-
holding copyright owners). The MySpace Music venture folded in 2011.
101. See, e.g., Resnikoff, supra note 68 (discussing digital start-up Turntable.fm’s strug-
gle with indifferent and disinterested content licensors).
102. See generally, Robert P. Merges, Contracting Into Liability Rules: Intellectual
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1294 (1996)
(noting CROs function as “promulgat[ing] rules and procedures for placing a monetary value
on members’ property rights” and thereby “conserv[ing] on transaction costs by either making
it easier to identify and locate rightholders, or by creating the occasion for repeat-play, recipro-
cal bargaining”).
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B. The King of Pop and Misrepresentation in Rate Setting
In 2002, pop star Michael Jackson was involved in a very public spat
with his music publishing company and co-venture, Sony/ATV, concerning
the promotion of his Invincible album. Among other allegations, Jackson
accused then-Sony head Tommy Mottola of being the devil, and made a
rather impassioned speech about the company’s lack of scruples and propen-
sity to take advantage of its songwriters.103 To the extent that Sony/ATV has
begun circumventing ASCAP—the performance rights organization
(“PRO”)104 that previously collected and administered the performance roy-
alties for their catalog—in favor of direct licensing deals that cut out song-
writers and misrepresent market rates, the King of Pop just may have been
on to something.
In 2007, Sony/ATV negotiated a direct deal with DMX, a digital music
service that provides music programming for retail stores and restaurants, in
which Sony/ATV accepted a lower performance royalty rate than that set by
ASCAP in exchange for a hefty advance.105 Unlike payments from ASCAP
that go directly to songwriters, privately negotiated royalties from the Sony/
ATV-DMX deal are paid directly to Sony/ATV, who then may (or may not)
pass along some unknown portion to their songwriters. An unrecouped106
songwriter may not receive any payment at all. Even fully recouped song-
writers are likely to lose out because standard music publishing contracts
deny composers a share in any advance payments received in connection
with a blanket licensing agreement, and sometimes even in royalties stem-
ming from a collective license.107 Free market advocates might argue that
these songwriters should negotiate better contract terms. This argument fails
103. See, e.g., Roger Friedman, Mottola Steps Up Spin War on Jacko, Implicates Pro-
ducer, FOX NEWS (July 13, 2002), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,57640,00.html. For
video footage of Jackson’s speech, see hassnain786, Michael Jackson Against Sony Speech in
London, YOUTUBE (Oct. 29, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mx0Un9K5dKQ.
104. A PRO is a specialized type of CRO for the administration of music publishing
performance royalties. See supra note 10 for a discussion of the form and function of CROs
generally.
105. See Paul Resnikoff, Songwriters May Never See a Dime from Apple’s New Music
Service . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Oct. 2, 2012), www.digitalmusicnews.com/permalink/
2012/121002dime (“DMX paid Sony/ATV an advance of $2.7 million dollars, and in ex-
change, Sony accepted a much lower royalty rate than that charged by ASCAP and BMI.”).
106. In a typical record or publishing deal, the record label or music publisher will pay
the recording artist or songwriter an advance to cover such expenses as recording, marketing
and tour support. Income received from sales of that artist’s recordings or compositions are
then applied against the advance until it is matched (i.e., until the artist is “recouped”). Only
then do most artists begin to see royalties from album sales. Until then, they are considered
“unrecouped.”
107. See, e.g., Resnikoff, supra note 105 (“[A]lmost all [publishing] agreements have a
provision similar to this one: ‘In no event shall composer be entitled to share in any advance
payments, guarantee payments or minimum royalty payments which Publisher may receive in
connection with any sub publishing agreement, collection agreement, licensing agreement or
other agreement covering the Composition.’”) (alteration in original).
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to account for the significant difference in bargaining power between song-
writers and publishers. Congress recognized this disparity and sought to cor-
rect it via the establishment of the rate court and PROs like ASCAP, both of
which are circumvented here.
Not only do Sony/ATV’s songwriters lose out on a share of the advance
(as most are contractually excluded from advance monies), they also suffer
reduced royalties resulting from the privately negotiated performance roy-
alty rate, which is lower than that which they would receive under ASCAP’s
blanket license. DMX was able to take their new, lower performance royalty
rate to the rate court108 as evidence of an alleged “market” valuation in order
to have the rate statutorily reduced, thereby further reducing songwriter rev-
enues across the board.109 In this example, then, not only are songwriters as a
class potentially affected, but so too are all licensors operating under the
new, lower performance royalty rate.
In addition to the distributive justice concerns raised vis-a`-vis songwrit-
ers who stand to lose performance royalties to which they are legally enti-
tled, the Sony/ATV-DMX deal also introduces concerns about
misrepresentation of a private valuation as a “market” rate. As in the Big
Machine-Clear Channel example, this misrepresentation can be accom-
plished legislatively via adoption by the rate court, or informally via industry
norms that come to accept the rate as “standard.” Both ignore the $2.7 mil-
lion advance involved in this case, thereby creating an artificially low “mar-
ket” rate.
To make matters worse, Sony/ATV’s withdrawal from ASCAP simulta-
neously lowers the value of ASCAP’s service by reducing the amount of
content a licensee obtains under a blanket license (making that license worth
less), while increasing transaction costs associated with engaging in multiple
licensing negotiations. By putting smaller publishers and songwriters that
lack the clout to engage in direct deals at a disadvantage, this adverse selec-
tion also introduces potential antitrust concerns, as Sony/ATV is under no
108. Like ASCAP in United States v. Am. Soc’y of Composers, Authors, Publishers, No.
41-1395 (WCC), 2001 WL 1589999, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 11, 2001), BMI operates under a
consent decree that sets the S.D.N.Y. as its “rate court.” See United States v. Broad. Music,
Inc., No. 64 CIV. 3787, 1994 WL 901652, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1994).
109. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. DMX, Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 49 (2d Cir. 2012) (confirming
adoption of DMX’s proposed rates over those presented by ASCAP and BMI); Steve Gordon,
DMX v. BMI Demonstrates that Digital Services May Use Direct Licensing to Reduce Their
Payments to the PROs but the Decision May Be Reversed on Appeal, THE FUTURE OF THE
MUSIC BUSINESS (July 12, 2011), http://www.futureofthemusicbusiness.biz/2011/07/dmx-vs-
bmi-demonstrates-that-digital.html (discussing DMX’s successful rate reduction campaign
based on the Sony/ATV direct deal campaign and asking “how can 550 direct licenses [the
number held by Sony/ATV] be a benchmark for the true value of the PROs’ blanket license
when those 550 licenses represent, in probability, only a tiny fraction of the songs represented
by the PROs.”).
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obligation to license its content at all, nor at a set rate, nor to all potential
licensees.
Since its deal with DMX, Sony/ATV has announced full withdrawal of
its content from ASCAP.110 This announcement means that all potential
licensees must now negotiate direct licenses with Sony/ATV, and demon-
strates a lack of confidence in the ability of a collective rights organiza-
tion—in this case, ASCAP—to obtain the best rate. In addition to serving as
proof of the “market” valuation for the purposes of future rate settings, the
values reached under Sony/ATV’s direct deals will influence other industry
players by setting a new baseline for other major licensors. The adoption of
these (presumably) higher rates as the new industry norm can serve to fur-
ther disadvantage smaller licensees who will be forced to adopt those same
rates, whether via formal rate court adoption or informal industry norms.
As with the Big Machine-Clear Channel example, an analysis in this
case that looks only at the potential downside ignores the major upside driv-
ing this private copyright reform in the first place: money. According to
Martin N. Bandier, Chairman of Sony/ATV, the publisher’s withdrawal
from ASCAP was “simply an effort to obtain a higher royalty rate[.]”111 It
worked. On January 17, 2013, Sony/ATV inked a direct licensing deal with
Pandora that increased performance royalties by 25% over ASCAP’s going
rate.112 This result demonstrates the ability of private parties to achieve a
better rate than the CRO, and serves as evidence that ASCAP is not necessa-
rily the most efficient option.
III. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
A. Is Private Copyright Reform a Problem?
From a free market or economic efficiency perspective, the private cop-
yright reform described herein is arguably a good thing: privately estab-
lished, fixed rates lend stability to an otherwise volatile and unpredictable
situation where the market rate is subject to both regular fluctuation, and
legislative and judicial whim.113 To the extent the private value can be set up
110. See Ben Sisario, MEDIA DECODER; Apple Web Radio Plans Stall Over Music
Rights from Sony/ATV, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2012), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.
html?res=9407E7D81238F93AA1575AC0A9649D8B63&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss (“EMI al-
ready withdrew its digital rights from ASCAP, and Sony/ATV will follow suit with the rest of
its catalog, effective Jan 1 [2013].”).
111. Id. We’ve seen, however, that this increase in royalty revenues does not necessarily
translate to songwriters, or to smaller licensors and licensees that lack Sony/ATV’s clout and
market power.
112. See, e.g., Sony/ATV Negotiates 25% Royalty Increase from Pandora: Report, supra
note 61.
113. In the decades since its establishment, Section 114 has been the subject of multiple
hearings and agreements, each resulting in unhappy (and frequently ill-suited) compromise.
For a good overview of the legislative turmoil surrounding performance rights, see Peter
DiCola & Matthew Sag, An Information-Gathering Approach to Copyright Policy, 34 CAR-
30 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 20:1
as a revenue share, the parties also avoid the unpredictability inherent in a
per-play rate, while better aligning incentives between licensors and licen-
sees and helping to foster a mutually cooperative relationship between par-
ties whose businesses are interdependent. The partnership fostered by a
revenue share sees the parties sharing in both the risk and the upside, unlike
traditional licensing deals in which neither party faces any consequence
from, or responsibility for, the success (or failure) of the other.
Under a revenue share, listeners may benefit from improved access to
new content and technology. Artists may benefit from increased exposure
and promotional opportunities. Technology companies may be more willing
to experiment with new services. To the extent private valuations like Clear
Channel and Big Machine’s grow to become an industry norm, society as a
whole may also benefit from a decrease in the social cost of legislation and
litigation around rate setting.114 If private copyright reform is both statutorily
permitted, and potentially more efficient and beneficial for the parties in-
volved than the compulsory regime, should we be concerned about its recent
proliferation? Why should we object to circumvention of an inefficient li-
censing scheme? For one thing, the goal of copyright is broader than eco-
nomic efficiency. The constitutional mandate for copyright calls for the
promotion of “the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”115 A phenomenon
such as private copyright reform, with its origins in risk aversion, is unlikely
to protect the interests of artists. In the Clear Channel-Big Machine deal, for
example, the parties circumvent Section 114 in an effort to attain better
terms and to avoid the uncertainty associated with terrestrial performance
rights, not in an effort to better support creators. In fact, precisely the oppo-
site effect is seen because circumvention of Section 114 denies artists the
direct royalty payments they would otherwise be entitled to.
Further, the fact that private copyright reform allows for gamesmanship
in rate setting runs contrary to the functions of the CRB laid out in Section
801(b)(1)(A)-(D), and the rate court under the consent decrees. The presen-
tation of a private valuation as representative of the “market” rate—when in
fact no market exists or substantive deal terms are omitted—questions the
reliability of the statutory (or industrially accepted) rate. Specifically, an ar-
tificially low royalty rate can discourage the creation of new works by deny-
ing artists a “fair income.”116
DOZO L. REV. 173, 221-238 (2012) (describing the history of royalties for “webcasting,” also
known as Internet radio).
114. That said, industry-driven customs focused on decreasing litigation are not always
socially optimal. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 11 (positing that “incorporating such behavior
[referring to risk averse private action] greatly expands infringement findings under trademark,
copyright, patent, and publicity laws, while narrowing defenses to such infringements. Indus-
try practices establish a highly restrictive IP regime—one in which virtually nothing is free
and no use is a fair one.”).
115. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
116. 17 U.S.C. § 801(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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In addition, smaller players may find themselves forced to operate under
a private valuation ill-suited to their business model, but without the means
to negotiate otherwise. In this sense, parties to private copyright reform im-
prove their own positions to the potential detriment of others’. Thus, despite
its potential benefits and efficiencies, unchecked private copyright reform
challenges copyright’s ability to best serve artists (via revenue generation)
and the public (via the encouragement of creation). It may also further exac-
erbate inequalities between industry players via the encouragement of ad-
verse selection. The next section describes in greater detail some of the
potential drawbacks of private ordering.
B. Amelioration of Adverse Selection and Distributive Justice Challenges
Despite its efficiency advantages for the parties involved, private copy-
right reform introduces adverse selection and distributive justice concerns.
As discussed supra in Part II.A, one concern is the ability to alter the rights
of non-parties under the law via circumvention of statutory protections. This
is the case where Section 114(g)(2)’s statutory distributions are passed over
in a private deal. Another concern is the capacity for private parties—usu-
ally larger, market-dominant players—to misrepresent a privately estab-
lished valuation as representative of the “market.” This is the case where
DMX presented its private rate to the CRB as representative of the “market”
rate in order to obtain a lower statutory rate. Finally, private copyright re-
form can present adverse selection problems where only more powerful par-
ties with large market shares are able to secure private deals, thereby leaving
smaller parties to operate under a weakened statutory regime.
Congress could alleviate these concerns by making compliance with the
statutory license mandatory, thereby eliminating private copyright reform as
an option. The fact that circumvention is taking place signals inefficiency in
the statutory regime, however, and it is counterintuitive to nonetheless force
parties to continue to operate under a system that leaves them worse off.
Another solution might be comprehensive copyright reform; i.e., a full re-
write of the copyright laws to better suit the new, digital age. If Register of
Copyrights Maria Pallante gets her way, that might eventually happen, but
even she acknowledges the ambition of such a proposal.117 In the meantime,
this section proposes two modest statutory amendments to ameliorate these
concerns.
117. In March 2013, Register of Copyrights Maria Pallante delivered a speech before
Congress calling for a full reconsideration of the copyright laws. Maria A. Pallante, Register of
Copyrights, The Next Great Copyright Act (March 4, 2013), available at http://www.law.
columbia.edu/null/download?&exclusive=filemgr.download&file_id=612486.
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1. Inalienable Statutory Protections for Non-Parties
The potential for circumvention of statutorily mandated protections by
parties engaged in private copyright reform is problematic insofar as it al-
lows private actors to thwart the spirit and purpose of the law; here, that of
assuring royalty payments for artists and songwriters. Section 114(g) allo-
cates a portion of royalty receipts to each of copyright owners, featured re-
cording artists, non-featured musicians, and non-featured vocalists.118 This
allocation is the result of Congressional intent to ensure payment to these
parties:
In the absence of the applications of the work made for hire doctrine
of the copyright law, record companies, as authors of the sound en-
gineering, and performers, as authors of their recorded interpreta-
tions, are joint authors of a sound recording. However, the work
made for hire doctrine often applies to recorded performances.
Under this doctrine, upon creation of the sound recording, record
companies are authors of both the performance and the sound engi-
neering portions of the sound recordings, and thus the sole rights
holders. Performers, in these cases, receive their compensation for
the performance from the rights holder on a contractual basis. The
Committee intends the language of section 114(g) to ensure that a
fair share of the digital sound recording performance royalties goes
to the performers according to the terms of their contracts.119
In fact, while revising the statute in the context of the Small Webcasters
Agreement of 2002,120 Congress specifically adopted a new methodology
that “contemplates that instead of the copyright owner serving as the inter-
mediary to receive all royalties and thereafter remit 50% to others, an agent
would receive 100% of the royalties and would remit 50% to the copyright
owners.”121 According to Representative Conyers, this provision was
adopted to “ensure[ ] that musicians, vocalists, and artists receive their royal-
ties from digital music directly from the collection agent instead of through
118. 17 U.S.C. § 114(g). Article XVII(1)(c) of ASCAP’s Articles of Association like-
wise specifies the distribution of royalties as follows: “one-half thereof to be distributed
among the ‘Music Publisher’ members, and one-half among the ‘Composer and Author’ mem-
bers, respectively.” AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS, ARTICLES OF AS-
SOCIATION OF THE AM. SOC’Y OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS, AND PUBLISHERS 19-20 (May 2002),
available at http://www.ascap.com/~/media/Files/Pdf/members/governing-documents/articles.
pdf. Article XX, Section 4 further notes that “[t]he royalties, or the right to participate in the
royalties, and the rights of the members in the Society, shall not be sold or otherwise disposed
of. . . .” Id. at 22.
119. H.R. REP. NO. 104-274, at 23-24 (1995) (emphasis added).
120. Small Webcasters Agreement of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-321, 116 Stat. 2780.
121. See 2 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT
§ 8.22(c)(3)-(4) (2013).
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other intermediaries.”122 The rationale is obvious: in the absence of statutory
protection for those musicians, vocalists and artists, the intermediary record
labels and music publishers might cut them out of their share of royalties,
precisely as seen in the examples of private copyright reform from Part II.
If Congress did not trust intermediaries to pay artists their share of roy-
alties, it is unlikely they intended to allow those same intermediaries to deny
artists their legal entitlement via the statutory authorization for circumven-
tion of the compulsory license contained in Sections 114(e) and
115(c)(3)(B). Private copyright reform that avoids this statutory distribution
therefore acts contrary to congressional intent.
Instead, I recommend a statutory amendment that requires parties who
negotiate around the compulsory license to adhere to the statutory distribu-
tional schema. This modest improvement obviates the potential for disen-
franchisement of artists, songwriters and other non-parties. This statutory
amendment would correct the congressional oversight, and would recognize
the legal entitlement to royalties as an inalienable right held by artists.123
There is precedent for this brand of congressional paternalism: the termina-
tion right for sound recordings.124 This right is an example of an immutable
rule established in an effort to protect a party (in this case, recording artists)
perceived as vulnerable relative to an intermediary (in this case, the record
label). Section 203, which allows an artist to terminate a grant of copyright
35 years after the date of execution of the grant, was established in an effort
to “safeguard[ ] authors against non remunerative transfers” and to specifi-
cally address “the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part
from the impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been ex-
ploited.”125 As an immutable right, the right of termination cannot be
waived, and survives even in the face of an agreement to the contrary.
The idea of inalienability in intellectual property right entitlements is
also supported by the literature. Professor Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas
Melamed reach their famous conclusion in favor of liability rules for intel-
lectual property through evaluation of various entitlements that they group
into three categories: (1) economic efficiency; (2) distributional preferences;
and (3) “other justice reasons,” which they use as a catch-all for idiosyn-
cratic entitlements that might not fit neatly into one of the other catego-
ries.126 The examples of private copyright reform presented in Part II
122. 148 CONG. REC. H7047 (daily ed. Oct. 7, 2002) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
123. As mentioned in supra note 88, an alternate view of Section 114(g)(2)—that of a
clause which reduces artist bargaining power up front—would not favor making the distribu-
tion inalienable. Insofar as this position assumes otherwise equal bargaining power between
artists and intermediaries, this Article rejects the alternate view, and advocates Section
114(g)(2)’s inalienability as the preferable course for most artists.
124. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (2012).
125. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476 at 124.
126. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1093 (1972).
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challenge the “other justice considerations” prong insofar as they potentially
cut out an entire class of intended beneficiaries; to wit, recording artists and
songwriters. Calabresi and Melamed also introduce the concept of “rules of
inalienability.”127 Such a rule should apply to protect non-parties whose enti-
tlements can currently be diminished, and even bargained away, by private
action in which they do not participate. That is to say, to the extent that
Congress allows circumvention of the compulsory license under Sections
114(e)(1) and 115(c)(3)(B), those deals should be limited to terms that re-
spect non-parties’ legal entitlements.
Application of an inalienability rule to artists’ royalty distributions
would still allow for the Big Machine-Clear Channel deal under Section
114(e)(1), for example, but would require that the monies received by Big
Machine, as rights holder, be distributed in accordance with Section
114(g)(2)’s mandated distribution. In this way, the spirit and intent behind
that section—i.e., that of guaranteeing income to traditionally disadvantaged
artists—would not be circumvented by otherwise legally-sanctioned private
action. To this end, I propose an amendment to Sections 114 and 115 that
requires compliance with the statutory distributions to recording artists and
songwriters. This language would make the statutory distribution scheme in
Section 114(g)(2) inalienable. In other words, it would allow for circumven-
tion of the statutory license so long as the mandatory distribution scheme
laid out in Section 114(g)(2) is observed.
In making the case for amendment over free market resolution, or even
litigation, it is important to note that the affected non-parties belong to a
class of smaller players who lack the size and market share to effectively
challenge the private action that threatens to legally bind them. In the Big
Machine-Clear Channel deal, for example, the typical back-up singer or ses-
sion musician does not have a manager to negotiate for him, nor a powerful
trade association, like the NMPA, to lobby or litigate on his behalf. The
same goes for the songwriters in the Sony/ATV-DMX example. Most song-
writers are locked into publishing contracts that explicitly deny them a share
of any advances received, and even of a share of any royalties received
under a collective agreement.128
Again, the free market argument that these songwriters should negotiate
a better contract, or enroll with a different PRO, is challenged by Congress’
recognition of the disparity in bargaining position and consequent statutory
protection. Similarly, smaller, start-up digital music programming compa-
nies that would compete with DMX in the Sony/ATV example are too small
in terms of market share to be worth the giant publisher’s time and effort for
a direct deal, and so are left to pay the higher ASCAP rate, making it more
expensive for them to expand their operations and to compete effectively.
127. See id. at 1111-15.
128. See Resnikoff, supra note 105.
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2. Full Disclosure of Terms Surrounding Private Valuations
The second potential concern raised by private copyright reform is the
ability for private parties to unduly influence law. This concern stems from
the influence that private valuations have on both the statutory rate and on
industry norms. The relationship between a privately established value and
the statutory rate is a direct one: in the case of musical compositions, the rate
court adopts a value presented as representative of the market rate so long as
it is deemed reasonable. In the case of sound recordings, the CRB adopts a
value presented as representative of the market rate if, after publication in
the Federal Register with a call for comments, there are no effective
objections.129
The CRB itself has lamented this state of affairs. In a 2009 rate setting
proceeding concerning digital phonorecord delivery, or DPD, the rate court
said “we have no choice but to adopt [the private valuation] as the basis for
the necessary statutory rates and terms applicable to the corresponding li-
censed activities. .  .  . The statute provides that the settlement is an adjust-
ment of rates and terms by the parties that we must adopt.”130 Given the
potentially prohibitive amount of time and money required to effectively
challenge a private valuation in the rate court, and the disparity in both
power and financing between larger (presenting) players and smaller (ob-
jecting) players, 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803 effectively delegates lawmaking au-
thority to private parties. To the extent that a private valuation is artificially
low, or incomplete, or misinformed, there exists a very real risk of setting a
royalty rate that suits the needs of the presenting parties at the detriment of
the objectors.
In isolation, the valuation reached in the Big Machine-Clear Channel
deal, for example, is lower than the current CRB rate. Presentation of this
private valuation as the “market” rate would therefore support a reduction in
the statutory rate. Such a representation ignores the broader picture, how-
ever, which includes a substantial share of revenue in the form of a terres-
trial performance royalty, as well as the promise of preferential provision of,
and placement for, content. In the Sony/ATV-DMX deal, for example, DMX
was able to take the new, lower digital performance rate—sans the $2.7
million advance—to the rate court as evidence of the “market” valuation in
order to influence a lower rate across the board, thereby further reducing
songwriter revenues.131
129. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803.
130. Mechanical and Digital Phonorecord Delivery Rate Determination Proceeding, 74
Fed. Reg. 4510, 4515 (Jan. 26, 2009) (referring to 17 U.S.C. §§ 801-803).
131. In the rate court decision surrounding the DMX rate, Broadcast Music, Inc. v. DMX,
Inc., 683 F.3d 32, 49 (2d Cir. 2012), it was alleged that DMX hid the advance’s existence in
order to convince other licensors to agree to the same low rate, but it appears that “the court
did not consider it relevant that DMX paid a $2.7 million dollar advance to Sony. BMI main-
tains that although the nominal rate Sony agreed to was $25, they would never have entered
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Even where a private valuation is not formally adopted by the CRB or
the rate court, the existence of a private royalty rate can effectively set a
“market” rate through industry norms. In his piece on rights accretion in
intellectual property, James Gibson discusses the phenomenon of private de-
terminations—such as the decision to seek a license for a use that may or
may not require one, just to be safe—that catch on until they come to be
engrained in industry practice.132 If the Big Machine-Clear Channel deal
proves successful, for example, other major broadcasters seeking to secure
exclusive content in order to build their digital radio businesses will be pres-
sured to offer the same terms (i.e., a terrestrial performance royalty in ex-
change for a lower digital rate) or risk losing out.133 Smaller licensors who
might prefer to continue collecting the higher digital royalty under the com-
pulsory license will likewise be pressured into conceding to the lower “mar-
ket” rate in order to avoid having their content excluded from airplay.
The same phenomenon can be seen in Sony/ATV’s withdrawal from
ASCAP and negotiation of a higher digital royalty rate with Pandora. Other
major publishers can now demand that same rate from Pandora, and from
other similarly situated licensees, eventually establishing it as the de facto
“market” rate, when in fact it was merely a compromise reached between
two parties in an industry of thousands. This industrial influence, or “peer
pressure,” extends even to private determinations that appear at first blush to
fall outside of the norm. These extraordinary valuations—such as the crea-
tion of a terrestrial performance royalty in the Big Machine-Clear Channel
deal—when endorsed by private action, can come to be seen as acceptable in
the marketplace.
This industry acceptance has a strong signaling effect. Other
scholars have considered the expressive power of courts,134 and of settle-
into the direct license unless they received the advance, and that DMX used the deal with Sony
to persuade many of the 549 other direct licensees to accept the $25 per location rate. As
BMI’s appellate brief reported, DMX never told the other direct licensee publishers about the
advance to Sony, and instead assured them ‘they would be the same as a sophisticated major
publisher who had accepted the same deal.’ Moreover, the $2.7 million represented approxi-
mately 150% of all royalties Sony received from both ASCAP and BMI for one year.” See
Gordon, supra note 109.
132. See Gibson, supra note 20, at 884 (“[T]he practice of licensing within gray areas
eventually makes those areas less gray, as the licensing itself becomes proof that the entitle-
ment covers the use.”).
133. Indeed, the Big Machine-Clear Channel deal structure has already caught on, with
several similarly-structured agreements having closed in the several months following its sign-
ing. See Peoples, supra note 81; Rys, supra note 80.
134. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Expressive Power of Adjudication, 2005 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1120 (2005) (concluding, in the context of adjudication, that: “When the
relevant facts or conventions are ambiguous, an adjudicator can resolve disputes by signaling
his beliefs—which works by screening out strategic disputes with sufficient probability and
then by providing a focal point that creates self-fulfilling expectations for how the individuals
will proceed. When the ambiguity is conventional, the adjudicator’s clarification of the con-
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ments,135 on both private actors and future legislation. Private copyright re-
form, especially where it sets a “market” rate in the context of an instable
and fluctuating industry, also has strong signaling potential, and shares the
primary concern presented by Depoorter in his work on settlement signaling;
namely, incomplete information. Depoorter notes that limitations on publicly
available information in settlement reports “introduce[ ] a potential bias in
the information that is available.”136 Likewise, in the case of the private cop-
yright reform, both the lack of a true market and the concomitant opportu-
nity to influence the statutory rate can, and in some cases like DMX have,
resulted in misrepresentation of a “market” rate. To the extent a private valu-
ation genuinely represents market interests, it can improve on congressional
attempts to set a rate in isolation. Where utilized to manipulate the market
and unduly influence congressional rate setting, however, private rate setting
is problematic.
In order to alleviate this concern, I propose a statutory amendment to
require full disclosure of terms and conditions surrounding a privately deter-
mined valuation. As with the fidelity language proposed in Part III(B)(1)
supra, a mandatory disclosure requirement could be added to Sections
114(e) and 115(c)(3)(B) as a condition for availing oneself of these circum-
vention authorizations. The language would require complete and accurate
disclosure of the circumstances and conditions surrounding a private valua-
tion to be made either to the CRB, in the case of sound recordings, or to the
rate court, in the case of musical compositions. These disclosures could be
filed and made publicly available much like a securities filing. While this
statutory amendment would not completely obviate concerns around mis-
guided industry norms—since those can develop independent of statutory
adoption—and would undoubtedly invite objections around protection of
proprietary business information, this amendment would at least make
gamesmanship more difficult by publicizing the relevant deal terms sur-
rounding establishment of a private rate, and privacy objections could be
handled in parallel to those raised in the case of securities filings.
3. Adverse Selection
The final, and most challenging, concern presented by private copyright
reform is the tendency for larger, more powerful players to opt out of the
statutory license in favor of private ordering, thereby leaving smaller,
weaker players with a less effective, and less well funded, statutory regime.
vention can set a precedent and thereby affect the behavior of parties other than the immediate
disputants.”).
135. See, e.g., Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of
Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957, 959-60 (2010) (discussing the potential for bias in
looking to public settlements—which tend to be outliers—as opposed to settlements whose
terms are kept private).
136. Id. at 986.
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Part II.B. supra described Sony/ATV’s withdrawal of its content from AS-
CAP, for example, as earning the company a royalty 25% higher than that
received under ASCAP’s blanket license. Without Sony/ATV’s content, AS-
CAP will undoubtedly command an even lower license fee going forward, to
the disadvantage of those smaller music publishers left behind.
To the extent that the statutory amendments suggested in this Part work
to ameliorate the distributive justice concerns, they also mitigate the effects
of adverse selection resulting from private copyright reform by minimizing
the impact on these smaller parties. Not only do they preserve artist pay-
ments, they also encourage fair rate setting. These results allow greater effi-
ciency for the parties involved in private copyright reform, without making
those left to the statutory regime worse off. As such, a more efficient result
is reached for both parties and non-parties. Given the call for the “next great
copyright act,”137 efficiency-minded legislators would be wise to pass these
amendments as part of their push to improve the copyright laws and their
ability to protect artists, and to encourage creation and innovation.
C. Doctrinal Considerations
For decades, private parties in the sound recording and music publishing
industries have operated under their respective compulsory licenses as a
practical, economical, and efficient means of content licensing. Recently, the
detrimental effects of technological developments, such as digital streaming,
have decimated the traditional business model of selling records. The ac-
companying decline in revenues in these industries have driven these same
parties to circumvent the compulsory license, and related CROs, in search of
stability, predictability, and—perhaps most importantly—revenue. The re-
sulting private copyright reform, while suffering from the deficiencies high-
lighted in Part II—namely the reduction, and even elimination, of royalties
to which artists and songwriters are legally entitled, and the misrepresenta-
tion of private valuations as “market” rates—brings stability and predictabil-
ity to royalty rates, while aligning incentives and encouraging cooperation
among licensors and licensees.
In other words, despite the touted efficiencies of compulsory licenses
and CROs, the private copyright reform observed in the sound recording and
music publishing industries points to rejection of the respective compulsory
licenses and corresponding CROs. Big Machine and Clear Channel, for ex-
ample, found the per-play nature of the statutory digital performance royalty
too onerous and unpredictable, and contrary to their shared goals of coopera-
tion and revenue building, and so opted instead for a royalty rate based on a
revenue share. Sony/ATV has withdrawn its content from ASCAP in order
to negotiate a higher valuation in the market. Sometimes the valuation goes
the other way: satellite radio provider Sirius XM recently reported conclud-
137. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
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ing over sixty direct deals, which they have presented to the CRB as “evi-
dence . . . that the market rate for sound recording performance rights . . . is
actually below the current statutory rate.”138
How can we reconcile these rejections with the common understanding
that compulsory licenses and collective rights organizations are an effective
means of governing intellectual property rights? And what do the conflicting
valuations presented from these private agreements tell us about the fairness
of a rate setting procedure that allows—even arguably encourages—private
law making? This Section will examine private copyright reform’s contribu-
tions to our understanding and treatment of intellectual property through
consideration of each of these questions in turn.
1. Compulsory Licenses and Collective Rights Organizations
Private copyright reform challenges the traditional understanding of
compulsory licenses and collective rights organizations as optimally effi-
cient mechanisms for content licensing. In their seminal work on property
rights, Calabresi and Melamed established a preference for liability rules in
intellectual property as a more effective means of collective valuation by a
court or legislative body; in other words, the precursor to a compulsory li-
censing regime.139 Indeed, we see compulsory licensing in industries—e.g.,
music and television—in which individual negotiation with rights holders
would be most burdensome and impractical given the quantity of, and lack
of commonality amongst, licensees and licensors. Compulsory licenses in
these industries allow for efficient, en masse licensing of content and subse-
quent scalability of service where individual transactions are not practicable.
Yet we see private copyright reform circumventing the compulsory license
and collective valuation in favor of a direct deal and a private valuation.
Part I discussed two impetuses for private copyright reform: industry
instability and legislative unpredictability. Both of these impetuses lead to
risk adversity, which favors private deal making. Under their deal, Big Ma-
chine and Clear Channel avoid an alternately unknown and fluctuating digi-
tal performance rate, and are able to forego the expense of lobbying around
pending legislation affecting those rates. Sony/ATV avoids leaving money
on the table where the collective valuation falls below what they can secure
in the marketplace. Private copyright reform therefore suggests that stability
and predictability outweigh the efficiencies of scale afforded by the compul-
sory license.
138. See Paul Resnikoff, Sirius XM Has Now Signed More Than 60 Direct Deals with
Labels . . ., DIGITAL MUSIC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.digitalmusicnews.com/
permalink/2012/121217sirius. Query whether a mere sixty deals can be rightfully considered
representative of the market as a whole.
139. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 126, at 1110 (“[T]he collective valuation
involved in liability rules readily lends itself to promoting distributional goals.”).
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Private copyright reform also contradicts the commonly held belief, first
introduced by Merges in 1996, that CROs are a superior means of establish-
ing valuations in an intellectual property rights regime.140 A couple of de-
cades after Calabresi and Melamed pled their case for liability rules,
Professor Merges countered, among other things, that a property rights re-
gime was in fact preferable as it was more likely to lead to the formation of
CROs, and that these entities raised overall welfare by serving a collective
valuation purpose while also saving transaction costs.141 That CROs save
transaction costs is undeniable. One, or even a few, blanket negotiations
with a handful of entities costs a potential licensee considerably less in terms
of both time and money than hundreds or perhaps thousands of negotiations
with individual licensors. Merges suggested that, in the absence of a compul-
sory licensing regime, an industry can and will minimize costs by setting up
CROs to accomplish the same end, while allowing for greater flexibility.142
In this way, he recommended the encouragement of CROs—a product of a
property rule regime—as a superior approach to intellectual property rights
allocation.143 Of course, the action effected by the resultant CRO—that of
establishing and enforcing a collective valuation—sets up precisely a liabil-
ity rule regime, only determined by individual rights holders instead of the
state.
Merges also suggested that property entitlements make sense in intellec-
tual property because IP owners can and will contract those property rights
away when it is efficient to do so, thereby avoiding “transactional bottle-
neck[s].”144 In a recent article, Professor Lemley questions this conclusion
by pointing out that IP owners can, and do, just as easily contract around
liability rules.145 In support of his argument, Lemley cites multiple examples,
notably the formation of SoundExchange: “It was the creation of a legal
right [referring to the digital performance right], not the creation of a prop-
140. See Merges, supra note 102, at 1295 (citing “two distinct advantages of CROs:
expert tailoring and reduced political economy problems.”).
141. Id. at 1302-03 (“It is the high transaction costs associated with the initial entitle-
ments that lead the parties to establish the [CRO] — an organization that then dramatically
lowers the costs of exchanging the rights.”).
142. Id. at 1296 (“What separates private CROs from compulsory licensing schemes is
that the former have proven to be more flexible over time.”).
143. Id. at 1297 (“[P]roperty rule entitlements may be superior in other situations where
rights holders encounter each other frequently.”).
144. Id. at 1295.
145. See Mark A. Lemley, Contracting Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463,
464-65 (2012) (“True, parties can contract around inefficient property rules in IP cases.
But . . . they can—and do—contract around inefficient liability rules as well. This is an impor-
tant adjunct to Merges’s key insight. My evidence does not prove the superiority of liability
rules over property rules, but it does undermine a major premise that has been used to support
the claim that IP rights must be protected by property rules.”).
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erty rule to enforce that right, that drove the founding of collective rights
organizations to administer public performance rights.”146
If CROs are so well suited for intellectual property valuation, why are
players in two CRO-rich industries—specifically, music publishing and
sound recording—opting out? Not surprisingly, the examples of private cop-
yright reform that we’ve seen recommend that a CRO viewed as inefficient
or suboptimal by the industry it governs—whether for insistence upon a per-
play rate basis or for failure to drive the hardest bargain—encourages private
bargaining where the parties believe they can do better.
Unlike the music publishing and sound recording industries, broadcast
cable and satellite companies pay their statutory royalties directly to the
Register of Copyrights by order of the statute. As such, there are no CROs in
those industries. I argue that it is precisely the existence of a non-govern-
mental entity for collective valuation and administration in the music pub-
lishing and sound recording industries that contributes to private parties’
willingness to negotiate around a compulsory license. First, the valuation
established by a CRO gives private actors a mutually agreeable starting
point. The collective valuation provides valuable information about the par-
ties’ respective positions, thereby greatly reducing the risk associated with
negotiating an alternate rate. Second, the existence of a CRO gives the par-
ties the comfort and security of a “back-up” that allows for small-scale ex-
perimentation without commitment to multiple and costly negotiations.
Neither party has to commit to the terms vis-a`-vis all partners, nor does
either party have to engage in costly, multiple negotiations, since licensing
with all other parties (with whom a private copyright licensing deal has not
been reached) can continue under the compulsory regime. Without the
fallback statutory license, parties would not be so free to experiment and try
out different terms with minimal risk. In this sense, private copyright reform
builds upon literature suggesting that the existence of a compulsory license
may in fact encourage private negotiation.
Ian Ayres and Eric Talley were the first to suggest that to the extent a
compulsory licensing regime is inflexible and unable to account for differen-
tiations among parties, its imposition may in fact lead to more efficient pri-
vate contracting and greater tailoring of terms than a property rule regime.147
They also showed that not only can liability rules induce private deal mak-
ing, but also that ambiguity can induce cooperation.148 This has certainly
proven true in private copyright reform: for example, ambiguity surrounding
146. Id. at 477-78.
147. Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to
Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1033 (1995) (“[L]iability rules may induce
both more contracting and more efficient contracting than property rules.”).
148. Id. at 1035 (using economic modeling to show “how ambiguity can induce bargain-
ers to act more cooperatively.”).
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digital and terrestrial performance royalty rates led to private action between
Big Machine and Clear Channel.149
Finally, the private copyright reform phenomenon contradicts the re-
ceived wisdom that risk aversion creates entitlements.150 In his piece on risk
aversion and rights accretion, Gibson names “[u]ncertainty regarding the
reach of intellectual property entitlements” as one factor leading to unneces-
sary licensing and rights accretion for copyright owners.151 Private copyright
reform teaches us that uncertainty, and the risk adversity that accompanies it,
can have precisely the opposite effect where circumvention of statutory dis-
tributions can diminish or even eliminate artists’ rights.
2. Private Law Making
Private copyright reform also questions the efficacy and fairness of a
regime that allows, and even encourages, private law making. While the par-
ties to private copyright reform stand to gain from their bargain, non-parties
without sufficient clout and funding to attract direct deals and to successfully
present private valuations to the CRB or a rate court are at a distinct disad-
vantage. Those without sufficient means and institutional know-how to chal-
lenge a proposed rate will ultimately be pressured into acquiescence either
by necessity or non-action. So we see that often what is termed a “collec-
tive” valuation, and treated as such in practice, is actually a private valuation
imposed upon non-parties in contravention of a statutory mandate intended
to protect their interests.
Not only are the private actors we’ve seen able to do better by circum-
venting the compulsory license—and with that, some of the intended benefi-
ciaries thereunder—they have also set a new baseline for both future
negotiation and future legislation. The Big Machine-Clear Channel rate, for
example, can both influence industry norms around digital and terrestrial
performance royalty rates, and can be presented as proof of the “willing
buyer, willing seller” rate in the upcoming digital performance royalty hear-
ings.152 Likewise, the rates agreed upon between Sony/ATV and licensees
outside of ASCAP, such as DMX, will undoubtedly influence ASCAP’s col-
lective rate as members lobby for a rate increase to match the new “market”
valuation. Meanwhile, potential licensees such as Pandora have sued for rate
reductions,153 suggesting DMX’s “market” valuation is hardly representa-
tive. Similarly, licensees who want access to Sony/ATV’s content will be
149. See supra Part I.
150. See Gibson, supra note 20.
151. Id. at 942.
152. The Pureplay Agreement set the relevant rates through 2015. 74 Fed. Reg. 34,796,
34,798 (July 17, 2009). In January 2013, the CRB began accepting and reviewing rate propos-
als for 2015-2020.
153. See Petition of Pandora Media, Inc., supra note 53; Peoples, supra note 62 (discuss-
ing Pandora’s lawsuit against ASCAP seeking a rate reduction).
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forced into terms similar to those reached with DMX, as they can no longer
access that content through ASCAP’s blanket license. Private copyright re-
form therefore suggests that private actors—especially those in a position of
greater influence and power—should not be allowed to legally bind an entire
class of copyright owners.
CONCLUSION
Advances in technology offer an amazing opportunity for experimenta-
tion in both new content delivery services, and the licensing of that content.
As technology continues to introduce uncertainty and unpredictability into
industries governed by compulsory licenses and CROs, it is more important
than ever to hold the copyright laws to their constitutional mandate to pro-
tect and encourage creators, and to prevent externalizing costs from parties
to non-parties. To the extent those laws inadvertently allow circumvention of
statutory protections for artists, those loopholes can and should be corrected
by statutory amendment.
Private copyright reform is in its nascent stage; ever-evolving changes
in industrial business models and consumer behavior will undoubtedly en-
courage its proliferation and influence its trajectory. Congress and scholars
alike can benefit from private copyright reform’s challenges and contribu-
tions to intellectual property theory. We can start by recognizing the short-
comings of compulsory licenses, CROs, and private rate setting in the new
technological age, and by promoting awareness of the risks to artists’ rights
posed by unchecked statutory circumvention.
